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INJURIES TO THE INTERESTS OF LANDOWNERS

By CHRLEs T. McCoIce*
1. COMPLETED INJURIES: WRONGFUL OccUPANcY: DAMAGE TO,
BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS, CROPS, TIMBER, AND MINERALs.

Damages against wrongful occupant.-When one man has,
without right, used and enjoyed the land of another, the owner
recovers the possession of the land by an action which at common law was k-iown as ejectment, and which retains that name
in many states, though the traditional proceedings in the action
have everywhere been greatly simplified by statute. One modification is to permit the owner to recover not only his land,
but in the same action, compensation for the deprivation of its
use.' This last claim had formerly to be asserted in a separate
action of trespass, for "mesne profits". The measure of damage is the amount of any waste or injury to the land2 and the
reasonable rental value during the period of the defendant's
occupancy, 3 with this proviso, that if the defendant has caused
the land to yield more than its reasonable rental, he is liable for
the value of the yield. 4 If the defendant, though actually hay* Professor of Law, Northwestern University; A. B., Univ-. of Texas
(1909); LL. B., Harvard University (1912); contributor to various
legal periodicals.
The substance of this article will form a chapter in a forthcoming
textbook on Damages to be published by the West Publishing Co., St.
Paul, Minn.
I See Dec. and Curr. Dig., Ejectment, See. 127.
2
Wismer v. Alyea, 138 So. 763 (Fla., 1932), and cases cited Dec.
and Curr. Dig. Ejectment, Sec. 129.
3 Prdfile Cotton Mills v. Calhoun Water Co., 204 Ala. 243, 85 So. 284
(1920), and cases cited Dec. and Curr. Dig., Ejectment, Sec. 132. If the
defendant clears the land for cultivation, the measure is the rental
value of the land as improved, not its value as he first took it. Anderson v. Sutton, 301 Mo. 50, 254 S. W. 854 (1923). In a suit f6r rents
and profits it is the value of the corn or wheat on the farm, not the
price at which it was sold, that governs. Anderson v. Sutton, 308 Mo.
406, 275 S. W. 32 (1925); but quaere, whether a count could not have
been framed for money had and received.
4 The cases put it somewhat more mildly by saying that the actual
yield is evidence of the rental value, but the intent seems to be as
expressed in the text. See Nathan v. Dierssen, 164 Cal. 607, 130 Pac. 12
(1913); Worthington v. Hiss, 70 Md. 172, 16 Atl. 534, 17 Atl. 1026
(1889); Capital Garage Co. v. Powell, 98 Vt. 303, 127 AtI. 375, 378
(1925) (Evidence of profits of garage business carried on by defendant
on premides in which plaintiff had conducted similar business). Con-
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ing no legal right of possession, believed that he had such right,
and acting in good faith, made improvements upon the land,
then under statutes common to most of the states, he may off-set
against the "mesne profits" the value of the improvements.5
Injury to Buildings and Improvements.-For completed invasions, injuries or trespass, the most usual formula of compensation is to the effect that the owner may recover the amount of
the decrease in value of the land affected, caused -by the invasion.6 There are, however, several alternatives to this simple
formula, each of which may be resorted to when more appropriate than the normal test of diminution in value. In the case of
injury to some structure or improvement upon the land,7 such as
buildings, fences, or wells, there are several methods of measurement available. First, if the improvement is destroyed, and
may readily be treated as a unit in itself, apart from the land,
as in case of a house or other buildings, the value of the improvement itself at the time of its destruction is usually taken as the
basis of compensation, 8 and in ascertaining this value, the origiversely, if the defendant, by negligence and poor husbandry, allows
the land to deteriorate and permits depredations of hogs and cattle,
the plaintiff recovers not merely the value of what the defendant
gathered, but the rental value. Credle v. Ayers, 126 N. C. 11, 35 S. E.
128, 48 L. R. A. 751 (1900), Bauer's Cases on Damages (2d ed.) 580.
5
Thus, the New York Civil Practice Act, 1920, Sec. 1011, provides,
that, "Where permanent improvements have been made in good faith
by the defendant or those under whom he claims, while holding, under
color of title, adversely to the plaintiff, the value thereof must be
allowed to the defendant in reduction of the damages of the plaintiff,
but not beyond the amount of those damages." And see cases collected,
and statutes referred to, in Dec. and Curr. Dig., Ejectment, Secs. :L42,
143.
Be~laire v. Worcester Lumber Company, 177 Mich. 222, 143 N. W.

63 (1913) (overflow, injuring farm in spots, measure is depreciation

of entire farm); Armstrong v. May, 55 Okla. 539, 155 Pac. 238(3)
(1916) (incursion by cattle); West Const. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co., 185 N. C. 43, 116 S. E. 3 (1923) (injury to road material plant
by railway car). See cases collected in Dec. and Curr. Dig., Damages,
Sec. 108; 3 Sedgwick, Damages, Sec. 932 (9th ed., 1920).
1 See Dec. and Curr. Dig., Damages, Sec. 111; 3 Sedgwick, Damages,
Sec. 935a (9th ed., 1920); note, 54 A. L. R. 1278, "measure of damages
for destruction
or removal of fence."
8
Clhicago & N. W. B. Co. v. Kendall, 108 C. C. A. 251, 186 Fed. 139
(Minn., 1911) (buildings); Sickles v. Mt. Whitney Power and Electric
Co., 177 Cal. 278, 170 Pac. 599 (1918) (house destroyed by fire); Walters
v. Iowa Electric Co., 203 Ia. 471, 212 N. W. 884(7) (1927) (farm buildings); Kennedy v. Treleaven, 103 Kan. 651; 175 Pac. 977, 7 A. L. R. 274
(1918) (residence); Reed v. Mercer County Fiscal Court, 220 Ky. 646,
295 S. W. 995, 54 A. L. R. 1275, note (1927) (stone fence); Hall v.
Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 126 S. C. 330, 119 S. E. 910, 33 A. L. R. 292

L. J.-7
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nal cost or the cost of replacement, with allowance for depreciation, may be considered. 9 Second, if the improvement is
merely damaged and not destroyed, damages are usually measured by the reasonable cost of repair or restoration to the condition before the injury,'0 together with compensation for the
loss of the use of the property during the period of repair.'1
(1923) (where property such as house, etc., has separate value, this
separate valde is basis of compensation plus injury, if any, to land as
a whole); United States Torpedo Co. v. Liner, 300 S. W. 641 (16) (Tex.
Civ App., 1927) (destruction of oil well which had cash market value,
damages for destruction of well by negligent shooting, value of well
less value of salvage). While market value is prima facie the standard,
buildings seldom have a separate market value proportionate to their
worth to the owner, and consequently the criterion is usually said to
be the "reasonable" or "real" value considering cost, uses, age, condition and location. Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Ohio City Lumber Go., 131
C. C. A. 57, 214 Fed. 751 (Ohio, 1914); Close v. Ann Arbor R. Co., 169
Mich. 392, 135 N. W. 346 (1912). Interest upon the value from the time
of destruction also may be allowed as damages, in some jurisdictions.
See Davenport v. IntermountainBy. Light and Power Co., 108 Neb. 387,
187 N. W. 905 (1922).
9 Conner v. Mo. Pao. R. Co., 181 Mo. 397, 81 S. W. 145 (1904) (destruction of mill by fire, original cost and replacement cost held admissible as evidence of value); Northwestern Ohio Nat. Cas. Go. v.
First Cong. Church, 126 Ohio St. 140, 184 N. E. 512(2) (1933) (destruction of church building 23 years old, so that restoration impracticable,
held, diminution in value of entire property correct measure, and cost
of reconstruction was to be considered); note, "Cost of building or repairs thereto as necessary or propbr element in fixing damages for its
destruction or injury," 7 A. L. R. 277. It is error, however, t5 instruct
the jury to award, for the destruction of a barn, its replacement cost,
instead of its "reasonable value". Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Nueols, 212
Ky. 564, 279 S. W. 964 (1926).
10Fitz Simons and Connell Co. v. Braun, 199 Ill. 390, 65 N. E. 249,
59 L. R. A. 421 (1902) (injuries to building due to use of dynamite in
excavating); Parishv. Baird, 160 N. Y. 302, 54 N. E. 724 (1899) (injury
to sidewalk); note, 7 A. L. R. at 287. The reasonable cost of repair is
recoverable, though it does not appear that the defendant intends to
repair. Bates v. Warrick, 77 N. J. L. 387, 71 Atl. 116 (1909). But the
cost of restoration is not a proper measure, if it appears that restoration would be an uneconomical way of handling the property. Hopkins
v. American Pneumatic Service Co., 194 Mass. 582, 80 N. E. 624 (1907).
See also, Watson v. Mississippi River Power Co., 174 Ia. 23, 150 N. W.
188, L. R. A. 1916D 101. If the building cannot be repaired, but must
be taken down and rebuilt, the measure is the diminution in valie of
the house. Kentucky Traction and Term. Co. v. Bain, 161 Ky. 44, 170
S. W. 499 (1914).
u Linforth v. San Francisco Gas & Blec. Co., 156 Cal. 58, 103 Pac.
320, 19 Ann. Cas. 1230 (1911) (loss of rental during time required to
make the repairs, under Civ. Code, Sec. 3833); Lexington & E. R. Co. v.
Baker, 156 Ky. 431, 161 S. W. 228 (1913) (diminution in value of use,
during period until restored); compare West v. Martin, 51 Wash. 85, 97
Pac. 1102, 21 L. R. A. N. S. 324 (1908) (loss of profits on toll bridge
during repairs). But if the building is not merely damaged, but de-
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This formula works well enough if the injured building or improvement was a reasonably new one, though even then the jury
should be warned to make a deduction from the cost of repair
for the fact that the repaired part would be newer and better
than the corresponding part before the injury, 12 but if the build1
ing is ancient and dilapidated,13 or not susceptible of repair, "
the courts are apt to prefer a different standard of recovery,
that is, the amount of the lessening in value of the structure or
other improvement, produced by the injury. If from the evidence the jury could ascertain both the cost of restoration, and
the diminution in value due to the injury, then seemingly they
should be instructe4 to allow damages on the basis of the reasonable cost of restoration, not to exceed the amount of the decrease in value due to the injury.1 5 Third, and finally, if the
stroyed, no alloivance for loss of use can be made. Consequential damages may be recovered, within the limits of "proximateness" and certainty. See B. L. Chester Co. v. Wis. Power and Light Co., 211 Wis.
158, 247 N. W. 861 (1933) (gas explosion and fire in store, resulting
in closing business for two months, causing loss of profits).
"'Reisz v. K. C. So. B. Co., 148 La. 929, 88 So. 120 (1921).
'5See, for example, Jefferson County v. Pohlman, 243 Ky. 556, 49
S. W. (2d) 344(5) (1932) (house 90 years old, injured by blasting).
Compare Chicago and N. W. R. Co. v. Davis, 78 II1. App. 58 (1898),
where It was held erroneous to admit evidence of the cost of restoration
of an old and dilapidated building, destroyed by fire.
' Conn v. Le ington Utilities Co., 233 Ky. 230, 2t S. W. (2d) 370
(1930) (house damaged by fire, incapalile of reasonable repair), and
see note 10, supra.
15 See the following cases in which it is stated that the allowance
for cost of restoration must not exceed the amount of the diminution
in value of the "property," i. e., presumably the land as an entirety.
City of Globe v. Rabogliotti, 24 Ariz. 392, 210 Pac. 685 (1922); Bates v.
Warrick, 77 N. J. Law 387, 71 Ati. 1116 (Sup. Ct., 1909); Hartshorn v.
Craddock, 135 N. Y. 116, 31 N. E. 997, 17 L. R. A. 426 (1892), Bauer's
Cases on Damages (2d ed.) 547. This formula seems to have been expanded and distorted in lUalifornig, into an affirmative rule that the
plaintiff may recover the cost of restoration limited only by the requirement that it must not exceed ihe value of the entire property
prior to the injury. Salstrom v. Orleans Bar Gold Min. Co., 153 Cal.
551, 558, 96 Pac. 292 (1908). As originally applied in this case, where
the plaintiff's land was covered with gravel by the operation of the defendant's placer-m-ine, and where the plaintiff's land was rendered
valueless for any purpose unless the gravel were removed, the changed
formula reaches the same result as the original one. It does make a
difference, however, in. a later case, where the plaintiff's residence and
yard were covered with mud and oil from the defendant's well. It appeared that the plaintiff's property was still substantially valuable,
at least for oil development, even though it were not restored for residentidl purposes. Nevertheless, the court held that the plaintiff could
recover the cost of restoration, up to the limit of the original value of
the property. Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac.

94
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improvement which has been injured or destroyed is one which
does not lend itself to separate valuation, 16 or even in the case
of buildings, according to a few decisions, 17 the general standard of the diminution in value of the land as "awhole, resulting
from the loss or injury of the improvement, may be adopted.
952, 60 A. L. R. 475 (1928). This may be defensible, as enabling plaintiff to continue to use the land as a home, but the result of the application of the California formula in a later case is more questionable.
In Dandoy v. Oswald, 113 Cal. App. 570, 298 Pac. 1030 (1931), the defendant had dumped upon the plaintiff's vacant lots, a large quantity
of material excavated from a street. The trial court found that the
value of the plaintiff's lots had actually been increased, and gave judgment for the ddfendant, but bn appeal it was held despite the abseffce
of material injury that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the cost
of restoring the lots to their original condition, amounting to a substantial sum, since this would not exceed the original value of the
lots. See critical comment, 5 So. Cal. L. Rev. 249. This is an extreme
application of the idea which finds expression in Cincinnati, Y. 0. &
T. P. R. Co. v. Falconer, 30 Ky..L. Rep. 152, 97 S. W. 727(3) (1906),
wherein the court said: "If the houses burned and sued for in' this
suit added little or nothing to the market value of the land upon which
they were situated, because perhaps there was no market at that place
for a storehouse or tenement houses of that class, it is nevertheless
true that the owner was entitled to them uninjured by the negligence
of any one else, and her right is, as against any one tortiously destroying them, to have her condition restored by giving her such sum in
money as will replace the destroyed tenements."
1 26Bradley v. Iowa Central R?. Co., 111 Ia. 526, 82 W. W. 996 (1900)
(hedge, destroyed by fire). See also Matthews v. Missouri P. R. Co.,
142 Mo..645, 663, 44 S. W. 802 (1897); HaNl v. Seaboard Air Line 2. Co.,
126 S. C. 330, 119 S. E. 910, 33 A. L. R. 292 (1923).
"Pacific Express Co. v. Lasker Real Estate Asso., 81 Tex. 81, 1I
S. W. 792 (1891) (House destroyed by fire; assessment of damage by
trial judge on basis of cost of replacement, reversed: "A business
house, residence, or house adapted to any other purpose, when. erected
in a given locality, may then have a value by reason of the adaptation
of the place where it is built to the use for which it is intended, which
it ceases to have in after time by the change of business, residence, or
other centers, whereby, at the later period, the property could not be
sold with the land on which it stands for one-fourth of what it would
cost to reconstruct it, if destroyed. In such a case, to give to the owner
of a house what it would cost to rebuild it, if partially or entirely destroyed, would be to give to him more than would be just compensation. In this time of rapid improvement in means of transportation
and in all other directions, it is no unusual thing for a town to spring
up rapidly at a place which for a time is the terminus of a railway,
and for persons engaged in trade to erect expensive houses for business purposes, but in a short time the railway is constructed beyond
that point and business goes with it, and then comes depreciation in
value at the point which has ceased to be a business center; and
houses then will not sell for anything like what it would cost to rebuild or repair if partially or wholly destroyed. In such a case the
measure of compensation applied in this case would be manifestly unjust." Texas and N. 0. 2. Co. v. Jeff Chaison Town-Site Co., 290 S. W.
890(1) (Tex. Civ. App., 1927) (similar to last).
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Under this last method of measuring the damages, if the building
is ill-adapted, to the site,--an expensive residence in an industrial
district, for example,-the jury would not be permitted to compute its value separately from the land, by the cost-less-depreciation method, but would be directed to ascertain only the diminution in the value of the entire property. This result seems
desirable in many instances, and probably in any extreme situation would be approximated by the courts which use the value
of the building as a basis, by a direction to the jury to consider
in determining the value of the building before the injury, its
suitability or lack of suitability to the location.' 8
Damage to Crops.--A frequent source of litigation is the
invasion, by fire, or water, or fumes, of land upon which crops
are growing.19 If the invasion merely prevents the plaintiff
from planting his land, the measure is not the value of the
20
hoped-for crop, but the rental value of the land for the season.
For a past and completed invasion, causing injury or destruction to a crop of a sort which is grown annually, such as cotton,
corn, or wheat, the basis of compensation is usually said to be
8 In Matthews v. Missouri P. R. Co., 142 Mo. 645, 665, 44 S. W. 802
(1897) the plaintiff recovered for the burning of a barn. The defendant
assigned as error the trial judge's instruction that the measure of recovery was the reasonable value of the barn, claiming that the diminution in value of the realty was the proper standard. The assignment
was overruled, and the court said: ". . . It might often happen that
a certain character of building would add nothing to the market value
of the real estate upon which it is situated. For example, a cheap
-dwelling house, on a valuable lot in a business block, would possibly
depreciate the salable value of the lot to the-extent of the cost of removing it, yet it could not be fairly said that the house had no value,
though it added nothing to the market value of the lot. The owner
has the right to use his real estate in any lawful manner he may wish,
and if the improvements he has chosen to erect upon it are destroyed
by another, he is entitled to reimbursement for the lost he suffers. No
rule is just which does not afford to the injured person fair compensation for the loss or damage he has sustained. If the building destroyed,
although a part of the realty, has an ascertainable value, we can see
no fairer rule for ascertaining just compensation for its loss than that
given the jury in this case. The value of the barn in its condition as it
stood upon the farm before its destruction is the loss plaintiff sustained and for which he is justly entitled to compensation. The jury,
it is true, might have been required to ascertain the value of the barn
with reference to its condition, locality and the uses to which it could
have been applied in connection with the farm, yet the generality of
.the instruction does not constitute reversible error."
"See Dec. and Curr. Dig., Damages, Sec. 112.
"Dilday v. David, 178 Ark. 898, 12 S. W. (2d) 899 (1929); City o1
'Chicago v. Huenerbein, 85 Ill. 594, 28 Am. Rep. 626 (1877).
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the value of the anmatured crop at the time of the invasion, 21
in case of destruction, or the difference between the value immediately before, and the value immediately after the invasion,
in case of injury.22 How is this "value" to be determined? Certainly in the case of most kinds of crops, in most localities, it
is not the custom to buy or sell growing crops, and consequently
no effective market value ordinarily exists.23 Accordingly, the
decisions usually sanction the practice of admitting proof, where
the growing crop is destroyed, of the probable yield and value
of the crop, when finally harvested and marketed at maturity,
and of the cost of the further care and cultivation, harvesting
and marketing, as evidence of the actual realizable value of the
growing crop when destroyed. 24 It is a short step from this
"Hoover v. Shott, 68 Col. 385, 189 Pac. 848 (1920); Zuidema v.
Sanitary Dist., 223 Ill. App.' 138 (1921); Bondreaux v. Thibodeaux, 149
La. 400, 89 So. 250 (1921); Missouri P. R. Co. v. Sayers, 82 Kan. 123,
107 Pac. 641, 27 L. R. A. N. S. 168 (1910); Puliam v. Miller, 108 Neb.
442, 187 N. W. 925 (1922).; 17 C. J. 887, Sec. 190.
If a new crop can be planted after the destruction of the old, the
reasonable profit realizable from the new crop must be taken into account. International Gt. Northern R. Co. v. Reagan, 36 S. W. (2d) 564
(Tex. Civ. App., 1931).
12United States Smelting Co. v. Sisam, 112 C. C. A. 37, 191 Fed.
293, 37 L. R. A. N. S. 976 (Utah, 1911); Mahaffey v. Carlson, 39 Idaho,
162, 228 Pac. 793 (1924);Houston and Tex. Cent. R. Go. v. Wright, 195
S. W. 605 (Tex. Civ. App., 1917).
See Rconomj Light and P. Co. v. Cutting, 49 Ill. App. 422, 425
(1893), approved in St. L. M. B. Assn. v. Schultz, 226 Ill. 409, 80 N. E.
879, 882 (1907). In a few states, an attempt seems to be made to.
draw a line between crops so immature as to have no market value,
-and,crops which are sufficiently mature to be sold, and to restrict the
plaintiff in the former case to the rental value of the land. St. Louis, L
M. and S. R. Co. v. Saunders, 85 Ark. 111, 107 S. W. 194(2) (1908);
Brown v. Arkebauer and Co., 182 Ark. 354, 31 S. W. (2d) 530(4)
(1930)
21
Teller v. Bay and River Dredging Co., 151 Cal. 209, 90 P ac. 942,
12 L. R. A. N. S. 267 (1907), with annotation; Uhrhan.v. Morie, 293
S. W. 483(2) (Mo. App., 1927) (good illustrative case as to the kind
of evidence received). Hall v. Brown, 102 Ore. 389, 202 Pac. 719 (1921)
(opinion evidence as to what the crop would have produced, admissible); Gulf C. and S. R. R. Co. v. McGowan, 73 Tex. 355, 362, 11 S.'W.
336(2) C1889); Lester v. Highland Boy Gold Min. Co., 27 Utah 470,
76 Pac. 341, 101 Am. St. Rep. 988 (1904) (following evidence proper:
Kind of crops land can produce, average yield in this and other neighboring land, stage of growth of crops at time of injury, expenses of
cultivating, harvesting, and marketing, market value at maturity);
and see cases collected, Dec. and Curr. Dig., Damages, See. 174(3);
17 C. J. 887, Sec. 190. If the plaintiff proves merely the prospective
value at maturity, without proving the prospective cost of raising the
crop to maturity, he fails to make out his case. International Gt. Nq.
R. Co. v. Reagan, 36 S. W. (2d) 564(11) (Tex. Civ. App., 1931).
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to say directly, as many cases do, that tbe measure of damages
is what the crop when harvested would finally have brofight, less
25
the prospective cost of cultivation, harvesting, and marketing.
While the distinction between the two formulas seems of slight
intrinsic importance, the instructions must be framed according
to the form locally preferred. The more direct doctrine, allowing as damages, the prospective net proceeds, is perhaps less
likely to invite difficulties over the question of whether there is
a market value, or disputes over the kind of evidence which will
be admitted to show value. The logical implications of the two
formulas differ materially in one respect. What is to be done
if it happens that the crop, destroyed on, say June 1, by fire
from the defendant's locomotive, would have been destroyed
in any event on June 15 by a flood which swept over the field
on the latter date? What is to be done if the later weather
conditions, as shown by the effect on the crops in neighboring'
fields, were merely unfavorable, resulting in less than usual
yields ? In the former case of subsequent destructive conditions,
it seems just and desirable to apply the standard of the value
at the time of the defendant's invasion, in which event the court
could properly say that the value was measurable by the net
proceeds that would have been realized from a crop of normal
yield, disregarding the avital later flood, 26 but counting in as
part of the cost of production, a charge (comparable to the
cost of crop-insurance) 'forthe risk of consequences such as hail
and flood.2 7 If on the other hand the later weather was merely
United Verde Copper Co. v. Ralston, 46 Fed. (2d) 1 (C.C. A.
Ariz., 1931) (holding limited to cases where there appears reasonable
certainty that crop would have matured, as in case of irrigated land);
International Agricultural Corp. v. Abererombie, 184 Ala. 244, 63 So.
549, 49 L. R. A. N. S. 415 (1913); Smith v. Hicks, 14 N. Mex. 560, 98
Pac. 138, 19 L. R. A. N. S. 938 (1908) (irrigated crop); and compare City of Portsmouth v. Weiss, 145 Va. 94, 133 S. E. 781(18) (1926),
where it was held proper to instruct the jury that the prospective proceeds of the crop less the prospective expense, "may be taken" as the
value at the time of loss.
2 Zuidema v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 223 Ill. App. 138(4) (1921)
(loss of growing crop by overflow). Evidence showed later flood not
caused by defendant; defendant's request for instruction that if later
flood would have destroyed crop, plaintiff cannot recover, held properly refused; "the fact that afterwards

. . . there was

a

flood

which submerged the land would in no way change the hmount of
damages."
St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Yarborough, 56 Ark. 612, 20 S.W.
515 (3) (1892) (destruction of crops by overflow caused by defendant's
embankment which caused the backwaters of a river to enter the
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unfavorable, the matter would be taken care of simply under
either formula -by directing the jury in estimating the probable
yield to consider the effect of the weather on the actual yield
28
of neighboring fields.
plaintiff's fields; on appeal the court held that in determining value at
time of destruction, the then hazards must be considered, and said:
"The water which destroyed them (the crops) was, as the plaintiff
testified, backed onto his lands from the rear, and passed over them
into the river. But the evidence shows that the overflow became general, and that a few days after the loss of the crops the river was out
of its banks in front of the plaintiff's farm, and covered it with water
flowing directly to it. It thus appears that the destruction of the crops
by the general overflow was impending, if not inevitable, at the time
the water was backed upon them. And yet it is evident from the damages assessed that the jury have valued the crops as if they might
have matured but for the wrong ascribed to the railway. We think
the proof did not warrant an assessment so large, and that the court
erred in refusing to set aside the verdict."); St. Louis, S. W. R. Co. v.
Ellis, 169 Ark. 682, 276 S. W. 996(3) (1925) (reversing for failure to
give defendant's charge that hazards must be considered in valuing
crop); Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Sayers, 82 Kan. 123, 107 Pac. 641, 27
L. R. A. N. S. 168, 175 (1910) (hazards of hail and rain must be considered in valuing crop even though ready for harvesting); Gulf, C.
and S. F. R. Co. v. McGowan, 73 Tex. 355, 362, 11 S. W. 336, 337 (1889)
("The crops were destroyed while growing, and before they had matured. As part of his evidence to establish their value at the time and
place they were destroyed, plaintiff was permitted to prove the value
of corn and potatoes of that year's crop in the fall, after they had
matured, and were ready for market. We think the evidence was
properly admitted. The only correct criterion for ascertaining the
value of a growing crop at any period of its existence is to prove what
that character of crop was worth at or near the 'place where it was
grown, when matured, and to make proper estimates and allowances
from ascertained or ascertainable facts for the contingencies and expenses attending its further cultivation and care."); 3 Sedgwick, Damages, Sec. 937 (9th ed., 1920); 17 C. J. 890, n. 39.
s United States Smelting Co. v. Sisam, 112 C. C. A. 37, 191 Fed.
293, 37 L. R. A. N. S. 976, 977 (Utah, 1911) (damage to crop, from
smelter fumes; "The stronger reason and the great weight of authority
are that evidence of the kind of crop the land will ordinarily yield,
of the stage of the crop's growth when injured or destroyed, of the
average yield per acre of similar land in the neighborhood, the crop
-of which was cultivated in the same way, and was not injured, and of
the market value of the probable crop without the injury, at the time
,of maturity, of the expense that would have been incurred after the
injury in fitting for market the portion of the crop the wrongful act
prevented from maturing, of the time of the injury, and of the circumstances which conditioned the probability of the maturing of the
crop at that time in the absence of the injury, is competent, and may
be weighed by the jury to find the damage to a growing crop at the
time of its injury."); Teller v. Bay and River Dredging Co., 151 Cal.
209, 90 Pac. 942, 12 -L. R. A. N. S. 267, 274 (1907) (approving statement that evidence of yield of neighboring fields should be proved);
and cases collected in 17 C. J., Sec. 190, p. 889, n. 33. Contra: Ward v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 61 Minn. 449, 63 N. W. 1104 (1895) (evidence of conditions subsequent to the loss, inadmissible).
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In respect to damage to crops, as distinguished from their
destruction, the same choice of formula, normally, Presents itself. The usual standard adopted is diminution in value of the
crop as it stood, immediately after the injury.2 9 This difference
in value is to be ascertained from evidence as to the value of the
prospective yield, the value of the actual yield, and the added
cost of cultivating and harvesting the crop if uninjured.3 0 A
few cases take this last directly as the measure of damages and
-notmerely as evidence of the amount of the lessening in value
of the crop at the time of injury.31 If the crop is one which
: Saycrs v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 82 Kan. 123, 107 Pac. 641, 27
L. R. A. N. S. 128 (1910) (action by landlord for damage to his interest in crops under share-rental tenancy; held, measure is diminution in value of interest in crops as it stood at time of injury, not in
ultimate value of mature crop; manner of proving value of immature
crop discussed in excellent opinion by Johnston, C. J.); Carter Oil Co.
v. Halloway, 130 Okla. 272, 267 Pac. 274(4) (1928) (farmer's testimony
as to value of immature crop before and after invasion by escaping
oil, held sufficient basis for award); Abilene & S. B. Co. v. Herman,
42 S. W. (2d) 915(6) (Tex. Civ. App., 1932) (condemning instruction
fixing ultimate value of crop if it has matured less expense, as measure.
This was evidence of value of immature crop but not measure of damage); Bader v. Mills and Baker Co., 28 Wyo. 191, 201 Pac. 1012 (1921);
and references, n. 21, supra.
But if the injury is continuing during the life of the crop as in
case of the repeated invasion of fumes, the measure is the difference
between value of the probable crop at maturity if it had been uninjured
and the value of the actual crop at that time less the expense which
would have been incurred in fitting for market the part of the crop
which did not mature. American Smelting and Bef. Co. v. Riverside
Dairy and Stock Farm, 149 C. C. A. 562, 236 Fed. 510, 513 (Utah, 1916)
(fumes); Bevill v. Allen, 28 Ariz. 397, 237 Pac. 184 (1925) (deprivation of irrigation water); Peacock v. Wisconsin Zinc Co., 177 Wis.
510, 188 N. W. 641 (1922); and in cases where the defendant's breac'
of contract to furnish water caused the damage, the contemplated profit
on the crop at maturity may be used as the measure under the contract theory of damages (Abilene and S. R. Co. v. Herman, supra, at
p. 919), and so also in the share-cropper's action against the landlord
for breach of the contract to turn over the possession of the land.
Rogers v. Mcuffey, 96 Tex. 565. 74 S. W. 753 (1903).
See Sayers v. Missouri P. R. Co., and Abilene and S. R. Co. v.
Herman,
in next previous note.
3
1International Agricultural Corp. v. Abercrombie, 184 Ala. 244,
63 So. 549, 49 L. R. A. N. S. 415 (1913), and see 17 C. J. 888, n. 28,
and cases cited in n. 25, supra.
In Texas there are pronouncements to the effect that while the
difference in value when injured is the criterion, this may be arrived
at by taking the value of the probable crop at maturity less expenses
saved and less the net value of the actual crop. International and G. N.
R. Co. v. Pope, 73 Tex. 501, 11 S. W. 526 (1889). In Iowa, the basis seems
to be stated in the alternative-either the value in the field or the
probable value at maturity less expenses. Farldy v. City of Des Moines,
199 Ia. 974, 203 N. W. 287(6) (1925).
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does not require annual planting, such as hay, alfalfa, or gras
for pasturage, then if only the annual produce is injured or
8 destroyed, it is separately valued as in case of annual crops, 2
but if the injury goes deeper, and the roots are damaged or
ruined, then the 'practice is to measure the damage by the diminution in value of the land itself, 33 or as an alternative the cost
of replanting, including the loss of use of the land while beingrestored.3 4
Trees and Timber.-In the case of injury to or destruction
of fruit trees or shade trees, some courts insist upon the standard
of the diminution in value of the land,3 5 and others upon the8Boulton v. Telfer, 52 Idaho 185, 12 Pac. (2d) 767, cert. den., 53
Sup. Ct. 115 (1932) (damage to grass by sheep); White River Sheep
Co. v. Barkley, 37 Ariz. 49, 288 Pac. 1029(4) (6) (1930) (similar to
last; measure is not rental value of land, but value to owner for pasturage of the grass, which has no market value; this value to the owner is
to be proven by opinion evidence); Chicago, R. I. G. By. Co. v. Ward,
207 S. W. 902 (Tex. Comm. App.; 1919) (burning of grass; plaintiff*
cannot recover consequent cost of feeding cattle, but is limited-distinguishing cases of contract and of willful tort-to the value of the.
grass to the owner for pasturage, of which rental value of land is
evidence). In California, the rental value of the land for pasturage,
where the grass has no value for harvesting, seems to be the measure.
Miller and Lux v. Pinelli, 84 Cal. App. 42, 257 Pac. 573, 575 (1927).
3 Baird v. Minn. &fSt. L. B. Go., 214 Ia. 611, 243 N. W. 515 (1932);
Thompson v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 84 Neb. 482, 121 N. W. 447, 23
L. R. A. N. S. 310 (1909) (injury to alfalfa by fire); Tex. Cent. R. Co.
v. Qualls, 58 Tex. Civ. App. 120, 124 S. W. 140 (1909) (sod injured by,
fire). But if there is not only permanent injury to the sod or roots,
but also the destruction of the present annual crop, shall the diminished value of the land be assessed so as to include the loss of the
standing crop? Yes. Black v. Highland Solar Salt Go., 98 App. Div.
409, 90 N. Y. S. 338 (1904) (injury to willow crop and roots). But
most cases seefi to allow the current damage and the permanent to be
found as separate items. Hayden v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co., 84 Kan.
376, 114 Pac. 384 (1911); Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. of Texas v. Malone, 59
Tex. Civ. App. 254, 126 S. W. 936 (1910).
' Pittsburgh C. d S. R. Co. v. Hixon, 110 Ind. 225, 11 N. E. 285(1)
(1187) (evidence of cost of reseeding meadow and of rental value
during idle period, admissible on issue of damages). Vermelya v.
Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co., 66 Ia. 606, 24 N. W. 234, 55 Am. Rep. 279
(1885), Bauer's Cases on Damages (2d ed.) 578 (instruction that
plaintiff recover cost of restoring meadow to as good condition as
before, sufficiently provides against putting plaintiff in better condi-.
tion by giving new, better meadow). Hayden v. Missouri, K. & T. R.
Co., 84 Kan. 376, 114 Pac. 384 (1911) (similar to last); 3 Sedgwick,.
Damages, Sec. 937a (9th ed., 1920). In Missouri, the cost of restoration plus loss in rental value, is adopted to the exclusion of the stand-.
ard of diminution in value of the land. Couch v. K. C. So. R. Co., 252
Mo. 34, 158 S.W. 347, 46 L. R. A. N. S. 555 (1913).
. * Dwight v. Elmira, C. & W. R. Co., 132 N. Y. 399, 30 N. E. 398,
15 L. R. A. 612 (1892) (destruction of fruit trees by fire: judgment
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loss of the value -of the trees considered separately,3 6 while a
third group permits the plaintiff to choose either basis.3 7 This
last flexible formula seems more likely to avoid needless diffi-.
culties of proof and wasteful reversals on errors in instructions.
When trees, valuable chiefly for timber are damaged or
destroyed, by fire or other cause, it is frequently said that the
plaintiff may sue either for the loss or injury of the trees, when
the damages are measured by the market value of the standingtimber, or he may sue for the injury to the land, determined
by the amount of reduction in value of the realty. 38 As to mafor plaintiff reversed because of admission of opinion evidence that
the trees were worth $50 each); Evans v. Keystone Gas Co., 148 N. Y.
112, 42 N. E. 513, 30 L. R. A. 651, annotated (1895) (destruction of
shade trees, difference in value of land before and after); Clevelan.
School Dist. v. Gt. N. R. Co., 20 N. D. 124, 126 N. W. 995, 28 L. R. A.
N. S. 757, annotated (1910) (shade trees). But some of these courts
admit evidence of the value of the trees, on the issue of the lessening
in value of the land. Missouri and N. A. R. Co. v. Phillips, 97 Ark. 54,
133 S. W. 191 (1910). The issue must be confined in the instructions to
the loss in market value of the land, unless a showing is made of"
absence of market value. Butcher v. St. Louis S. F. R. Co., 225 Mo.
App. 749, 39 S.W. (2d) 1066(8) (1931).
36Barker v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 94 Kan. 61, 145 Pac, 829 (1915)
(orchard); Louisville.& N. R. Co. v. Beeler, 126 Ky. 328, 103 S. W.
300, 11 L. R. A. N. S. 930, annotated (1907) (orchard). Possibly in
view of modern methods of transplanting mature shade trees, the
cost of replacement might be used as evidence of value. Compare City
of New Orleans v. Shreveport Oil Co., 170 La. 1.32; 128 So. 35 (1930).
But such evidenae is disapproved in Nordgren v. Southwestern Bell*
Telephone Co., 125 Kan. 33, 262 Pac. 57? (1928).
TAtchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Geiser, 68 Kan. 281, 75 Pac. 68(3),
1 Ann. Cases 812 (1904) (fruit trees); Bailey v. Chicago, M. & St. P.
R Co., 3 S. D. 531, 54 N. W. 596, 19 L. R. A. 653 (1893) (trees and'
shrubbery); Fairview FruitV1o. v. H. P. Brydon & Bro., 85 W. Va. 609,
102 S.E. 231 (1920) (fruit trees: opinion evidence, based on hypothetical question, as to value per tree, approved: good opinion by
Williams, P., reviewing decisions). See also, Stephenville, N. & S. T.
R. Co. v. Baker, 203 S. W. 385 (Tex. Civ. App., 1918) (fruit and shade
trees near residence), and Shell Pipe Line Corp. v. Sorcek, 37 S. W.
(2d) 297 (1931) (pecan trees, valuable for commercial production),
In which the value of the trees "for the use intended by the owner"
is recognized as an alternative standard. Compare Spear v. Hoffses,
148 Atl. 146 (Maine, 1929) (held proper to instruct jury to find reduction in market value of land, by destruction of trees by fire, with re-.
gard to most valuable use, whether for timber or shade or beauty).
See also Alfred Atmore Pope Foundation v. N. Y. N. H. & H. B. Co.,.
106 Conn. 423, 138 AtI. 444 (1927); Crane's Cases on Damages, 265, in
which owner of a large estate purchased for use for school of forestry,
was allowed to recover the diminution of the value of the entire estate.
for the purpose intended, due to the destruction of the timber in the
woodland
forming the major part of the property.
38 Bailey v. Chicago, M. d St. P,, R. Co.,*3 S. Dak. 531, 54 N. W.
596, 19 L. R. A. 653, annotated (1893); Dannielley v. Virginia R. Co.,.
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ture standing timber, these measures seem to reach the same
result, but if some or all of the trees injured are immature and
too small for cutting, then it behooves the plaintiff to shape his
pleading and proof to support a judgment for the loss in value
.of the realty, as the mere recovery of the value of the young
.growth, if it had been cut for timber just before the injury,
39
would not compensate him for its potential value.
If the wrong complained of is not the injury or destruction
of the trees but the cutting of them by the defendant and his
appropriation of the timber, 40 then if the defendant's depredation was done under an innocent mistake as to boundary or
ownership, he will usually be held in an action in the nature
of trespass to the land, as in the cases just discussed of negligent
injury to the timber by fire or the like, only for the diminished
4
value of the land or the value of the trees before cutting. '
103 W. Va. 97, 136 S. E. 691 (1927). Some decisions, however, insist
upon the standard of the loss of the value of the trees, e. g., Kansas
City & 0. R. Co. v. Rogers 48 Neb. 653, 67 N. W. 602 (1896). Others,
more numerous, adopt as the sole standard, the loss in value of the
land. Reynolds v. Gt. Northern R. Co., 119 Minn. 251, 139 N. W. 30, 52
L. R. A. N. S. 91, annotated (1912); 3 Sedgwick, Damages, Sec. 933
(9th ed., 1920); 17 C. J. 891, 892, Sec. 191. Even under the latter
,doctrine, it is recognized that evidence of the value of the trees for
timber may come into show the value they added to the land. Reynolds
v. Gt. Northern 1. Co., supra; Busche v. New York, S. TV. R. Go., 159
Atl. 789(4) (N. J. Sup., 1932); Williams v. Rim City Lumber Co., 15..
N. C. 306, 70 S. E. 631, Ann. C. 1912A, 917 (prospective value of immature trees cut may be shown as bearing on diminution in value of
land). But in an action for railroad's negligence in setting fire to
-standing timber which plaintiff had contracted to cut, the plaintiff
was denied recovery for loss of profits on the contract. Thompson v.
Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 165 N. C. 377, 81 S. E. 315, 52 L. R. A. N. S.
97 (1914).
SThus, in Danielley v. Virginia R. Co., 103 W. Va. 97, 136 S. E.
691(3) (1927),.where plaintiff sued for damage from fire, to immature
trees, instead of suing for injury to the land, it was held that he was
limited to the value of the young trees for present cutting for timber.
See also, Hdl v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 126 S. C. 330, 119 S. E. 910,
.33 A. L. R. 292 (1923). In Feather River Lumber Co. v. United States,
30 Fed. (2d) 642 (7) (C. C. A. Cal., 1929), an action by the government
for the destruction by fire of the young growth of timber on 4,000
acres of public land, it was held that the actual value of the trees was
'recoverable, and that this was not to be measured by the lessening in
market value of the land, since there was no law authorizing its sale.
but the cost of reforestation of the land may be shown.
4 See, in general, as to the measure of damages for cutting timber,
Dec. and Curr. Dig., Trespass, Sec. 52; Sutherland, Damages, Sec. 1111
(4th ed., 1916).
4
Bunch v. Pittman, 123 Ark. 127, 184 S. W. 850 (1916) (value of
standing timber), but see American Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Bynum,
,158 Ark. 639, 250 S. W. 22(3) (1923); J. F. Bali & Bro. Lumber Co. v.
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This hardly seems an adequate measure of relief to a plaintiff'
who intended to market his trees not by selling them as standing timber, but by cutting them and selling them as logs or lumber. 42 Accordingly, if the plaintiff plants his case against theinnocent taker of timber, on the theory43 of the conversion of
Bmms Lumber Co., 121 La. 627, 46 So. 674, 18 L. R. A. N. S. 244, annotated (1908) (value of the stumps); Powers v. Trustees of CaledoniaCounty Grammar Schools, 93 Vt. 220, 106 Atl. 836 (1919) (stumpage
value, with interest). Wood v. Weaver, 121 Va. 250, 92 S. E. 1001
(1917). In Wisconsin, by statute, the defendant by filing an affidavit
that the cutting was done by mistake, and offering to pay therefor,.
may reduce his liability to the value of the logs, "when cut." Wis..
Stats., 1929, Sec. 331.18; see Fehrman v. Bissell Lumber Co., 188 Wis.
82, 204 N. W. 582, 205 N. W. 905 (1925).
The decisions of the Supreme Court leave some doubt whether the
Federal rule (if there is one except that of following local doctrine)
ad6pts stumpage value or value immediately after cutting, as the test.
The decisions are reviewed and the former measure hesitantly adopted,
in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. InternationalPaper Co., 132 Fed.
92, 106(6) (C. C., N. H., 1904), Crane's Cases on Damages 1.
I See Green v. Southern Timber Co., 291 Fed. 582, 584 (Dist. Ct.,
S. D., Ga., 1923), wherein Barrett, J., said: "Reckoning the damage on
the basis of stumpage would be to disregard the unwillingness of the
owner to sell. The defendant was a trespasser, even though unwittingly. Surely he should be content to forego any profit. After considering all of the cruises introduced in evidence, and with the full
appreciation that certainty of accuracy does not attach to any one, I
have concluded to adopt Jasspon's as the most satisfactory and toadopt his second line estimate. This shows a total, exclusive of the
hammocks, of 290,970 feet, and the hammocks 50,740 feet, making a
total of 341,710 feet." He awarded damages computed on the basis
of the price for which the trespasser sold the logs, deducting therefrom only the out-of-pocket expense of cutting, skidding, loading and
transporting, but refusing to include in such deduction any "over-head" charges, for cost of tram-road construction, general expense,
and depreciation of equipment. See also, notes (45) and (51), infra.
The rich abundance of theories open to the pleader in these cases
is indicated by the following passage: "Where standing timber on
the plaintiff's land is wrongfully cut, the plaintiff's choice of remediesis more extensive. '(1) He may bring an action of trespass quare
clausum, wherein he will recover the damage done to the real estate;
that is to say, the diminution in the value of the real estate caused by
the cutting. If he alleges, by way of aggravation, a trespass upon hispersonal property, viz., the logs, after severance from the realty, he
may recover for that also, thus joining his two causes of complaint in
one action. (2) He may bring trespass de bonis asportatis, whereinhe will recover the damage done by carrying off the logs wrongfully
cut. (3) He may bring trover, in which case he will recover the value
of the person')l property-the logs-at the time and place of conversion. As to the three forms of action just mentioned, see Warner v.
Abbey, 112 Mass. 355. (4) He may bring replevin. By this action hewill, in some jurisdictions, recover the logs themselves, and in others
will recover their value variously estimated. In some jurisdictions the
action of replevin sounds altogether in damages, and differs but little
from the action of trover. (5) He may physically retake his severed,
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the timber, many courts will base the award upon the value of
the trees when they first became personal property, i. e., immediately after being felled, 44 but from this amount some of
these courts will off-set the cost of the cutting by the innocent
trespasser. 45 But, if the defendant in cutting his neighbor's
property. By this act he will recover the property itself. Indeed,
*though he commits a breach of the peace in the recovery, yet he will
still recover his property. His civil or criminal liability for his violence -will not divest his title. See Pabst -Brewing Co. v. Greenberg,
117 Fed. 135, 55 C. C. A. 151. Other forms of action, such as detinue,
or a bill in equity, may be employed in some jurisdictions and under
-some circumstances; and the injured man may sometimes pursue more
than one remedy at once. It is plain that in some instances the damages recovered in an action of trespass quare clausum will be greater
than those recovered in trover. In other instances the damages in
trover will be the larger." Lowell, Dist. J., in Trustees of Dartmouth
,College v. International Paper Co., 132 Fed. 92, 94 (C. C., Dist. N. H.,
1904). Another important avenue of relief is the statutory action given
in many states for treble damages, or other penalty; see notes (67)
-and (68), infra.
"United States v. St. Anthony R. R. Co., 192 U. S. 524, 542, 24
.Sup. Ct. 333, 48 L. Ed. 548 (1903) (purchaser from innocent trespasser,
"value of the timber where it was cut at the place where it was cut");
White v. Yawkey, 108 Ala. 270, 19 So. 360, 32 L. R. A. 199, 54 Am. St.
Rep. 159 (1896) (same; value of the logs Immediately after severance;
emphasizing distinction between trespass to the land, and trover).
Wright v. Skinner, 34 Fla. 454, 16 So. 335 (1894) (innocent trespasser
chargeable for value at time of conversion, with no deduction for costs
incurred before the logs are removed from the land).
"The variety of treatment of the problem by the courts has been
well stated by Judge Lowell, as follows: "Unfortunately, the precise
measure of the allowance to the defendant for his improvements has
been stated by different courts--or by the same court-in many ways.
In theory the allowance should equal the cost of the defendant's improvement, not to exceed the consequent enhancement of value in the
property converted. Bft sometimes the plaintiff has been limited to
the recovery of (a) stumpage, or, in the case of coal, of reasonable
royalty (Hilton v. Wpods, L. R. 4 Eq. 432; Livingston v. Rawyards
Co., 5 A. C. 25; United States v. Homestake Co., 117 Fed. 481, 54 C. C.
A. 303;. Unitd States v. Northern Pacific R. R. (C. C.), 67 Fed. 890;
King v. Merriman, 38 Minn. 47, 35 N. W. 570; Whitney v. Huntington,
37 Minn. 197; 33 N. W. 561; Chappell v. Puget Sound Co., 27 Wash. 63,
67 Pac. -391; -Miss. Co. v. Page, 68 Minn. 269, 71 N. W. 4; Illinois Cent.
R. R. v. Leblanc, 74. Miss. 626, 21 South. 748; Forsyth v. WVells, 41 P.
291, 80 Am. Dec. 617); sometimes the value after severance, less expense of severing (See Durant Mining Co. v. Percy Mining Co., 93
Fed. 166, 167, 35 C. C. A. 252; Colorado Co. v. Turck, 70 Fed. 294, 17
-C. C. A. 128); sometimes (c) stumpage plus profit (Winchester v.
Craig, 33 Mich. 205; Anderson v. Besser (Mich.), 91 N. W. 737); sometimes (d) value at severance, less what it would have cost the plaintiff to sever (see Morgan v. Powell, 3 Q. B. 278); sometimes (e) value
at time of action brought, or at some other time after severance, less
-expense of improvement (see Jegon v. Vivian, L. R. 6 Ch. 742; United
Merthyr Co., L. R. 15 Eq. 46; Powers v. United States, 119 Fed. 562,
56C.-C. A. 128; Herdic v. Young, 55 Pa. 176, 93 Am. Dec. 739); some-
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timber acted deliberately, knowing that he was taking another's
property, he will be held liable for the value of the timber and
its products as improved by his labor, without any allowance
for the cost of cutting, milling or other processing.4 6
This same distinction between the extent of the accountability of the innocent, and of the conscious wrongdoer, is applied in actions against those who unlawfully remove from another's land gravel, ore, coal, oil and other minerals. 47 The innocent taker's liability is ordinarily said to be measured by the
times (f) value immediately after severance, on the theory that there
can be no conversion of chattels until after severance from the realty
(see United States v. Van Winkle, 51 C. C. A. 533, 113 Fed. 903; White
v. Yawkey, 108 Ala. 270, 19 South. 360, 32 L. R. A. 199, 54 Am. St. Rep.
159; Ivy Co. v. Alabama Co., 135 Ala. 579, 33 South. 547, 93 Am. St. Rep.
46; Franklin Coal Co. v. McMillan, 49 Md. 549, 33 Am. Rep. 280; Blaen
Co. v. MeCulloh, 59 Md. 403, 43 Am. Rep. 560; Morgan v. Powell, 3
Q. B. 278; Martin v. Porter,5 M. & W. 351; Beede v. Lamprey, 64 N. H.
510, 15 Atl. 133, 10 Am. St. Rep. 426); sometimes (g) value when removed from plaintiff's land, because the conversion is not deemed cqmplete until then (Wright v. Skinner, 34 Fla. 453, 16 South. 335); sometimes (h) defendant's profit received (Colorado Mining Co. v. Turck,
70 Fed. 294,; 17 C. C. A. 128); sometimes (i) value at time of action
brought, or at some other time after severance, less value added by
defendant (Coal 0o. v. Coal Co., 24 Colo. 116, 48 Pac. 1045; Peters Co.
v. Lesh, 119 Ind. 98, 20 N.*E. 291, 12 Am. St. Rep. 367). Some of these
rules seem to have been adopted as rough and ready measures of convenience, some without recognition of the difference between them.
Each and all are deemed to furnish an allowance for the value of improvements made in good faith upon the property of another, and all
show that diminished damages are permitted by way of allowance to
a defendant, rathdr than are enhanced damages inflicted for his punishment." Trustees of Dartmouth College v. InternationalPaper Co., 132
Fed. 92, 97 (C. C. Dist. N. H., 1904), see n. (43), supra.
The most defensible solution seems to be the one reached- in Green
v. Southern Timber Co., 291 Fed. 582 (Dist. of S. D., Ga., 1923), supra,
n. (42), that is, the highest value realized by the trespasser, less the
out-of-pocket expense.
'"Williamson v. Chicago Mill and Lumber Corp., 59 Fed. (2d)
918(12) (C. C. A., Ark., 1932); Grant v. Fletcher, 283 Fed. 243, 265
(Dist. Ct., E. D. Mich., 1922) (collecting authorities); C. A. Smith
Timber Co. v. Auld, 134 C. C. A. 512, 218 Fed. 824 (Minn., 1914);
Kangas City Fiber Box Co., 184 Ark. 704, 44 S. W. (2d) 325(7) (1931) ;
Kahle v. Crown Oil Co., 1380 Ind. 131, 100 N. E. 681 (1913); Sittauer v.
Alvin, 151 Minn. 508, 187 N. W. 611 (1922) ; Bailey v. Hayden, 65 Wash.
57, 117 Pac. 720 (1911) ; Mo~aughton v. Booth, 136 Wis. 543, 117 N. W.
1031 (1908) (statute). In Louisiana, however, the willful trespasser
may deduct from the value of the finished product the cost of manufacture. Leopold v. Bradford Hutchinson Lumber Co., 172 La. 110, 133
So. 379(4) (1931).
" See, generally, Dec. and Curr. Dig., Trespass, Sec. 52, Mines and
Minerals, Sec. 51(5); 3 Sedgwick, Damages, Sec. 935 (9th ed., 1920);
notes, "Right of the trespasser to credit for expenditures in producing
oil or mineral," 7 A. L. R. 908, 23 A. L. R. 193.
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value of the substance or mineral "in place", i. e., in the
ground. 48 Some courts measure this by the "royalty" value,
that is, by the amount for which the land-owner could sell theprivilege of mining or removing the mineral. 4 9 This, however,
allows the appropriator to make the customary profit upon the
mining operation. Consequently, most courts would take as the
measure5" the value of the material when brought to the surface,
e. g., coal at the mouth of the pit, or oil as received in tanks or
.-pipeline, less the direct cost of extracting and "lifting". 5 ' The
8Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Decker, 7 S. W. (2d) 293(2)
(Ark., 1929) (gravel); Brady v. 'Stafford, 115 Ohio St. 67, 152 N. E. 183
(1926) (coal); Matthews v. Rush, 262 Pa. 524, 105 Atl. 817 (1919)

(coal).
In a few states, however, as in the case of cutting timber, the inno-

cent trespasser may be held, if suit is brought on the theory of conversion, for the entire value of the ore after it is taken out.. Ivy Cloal
& Coke Co. v. Alabama Coal & Coke Co., 135 Ala. 579, 33 So. 547, 93.
Am. St. Rep. 46 (1902); Galloway Coal Co. v. Bessemer Coal, Iron &
Sand Co., 210 Ala. 537, 98 So. 779 (1924) (value of coal on cars less.
cost of moving and loading but with no deduction for-cost of mining);
Donovan v. Consolidated Coal Go., 187 Ill. 28, 58 N. E. 290, 79 Am. St.
Rep. 206 (1900), and see Crane's Cases on Damages, 290, note, and
annotation, 7 A. L. R. 908, at 927-932.
4Ashurst v. Cooper's Admrs., 232 Ky. 498, 23 S. W. (2d) 916'
(1930) (coal); Trustees of Proprietors of Kingston v. Lehigh Valley
Coal Co., 241 Pa. 481, 88 Atl. 768 (1913) Crane's Cases on Damages,
288 (action by lessors, who had given a 999-year lease against persons
claiming under lessee, for taking coal under circumstances constituting waste; held, royalty value allowable, there being a present market
value on royalty basis; otherwise would be the acreage value of the
coal in place).
0Sometimes this measure, value after extraction less cost, is
said to be the way to, arrive at the "value in place." This is true, if
"realizable" value, is meant rather than "market" value, which would
be the royalty value. Value after extraction, less cost of extraction,
may be more simply rationalized as a basis of compensation in itself,
adopted in oider to give the owner the benefit of any profit in the
mining operation, rather than as a mode of measuring "value in place."
1Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S.101, 35 Sup. Ct. 536(8), 59 L. Ed. 856
(I1l., 1915) (accounting in equity brought by earlier lessee for oil takerr
by one operating under later lease; defendant held liable for oil as
sold in pipeline, less cost of improvements and operation, incurred
before notice of earlier lease); Kahle v. Crown Oil Co., 180 Ind. 131,
100 N. E. 681 (1913) (oil); Cypress Creek Coal Co. v. Boonville Mining
Cb., 194 Ind. 187, 142 N. E. 645 (1924) (coal); Holliday v.Dunn and
Baker, 125 Ore. 144, 265 Pac. 1096 (1928) (damages for rock used for
surfacing highway, value when ready for use less expense of preparation); Bender v. Brooks, 103 Tex. 329, 127 S.W. 168 (1910), Bauer's.
Cases on Damages, 561 (2d ed.) (value of oil "when delivered at the
surface or in tanks, deducting the cost of lifting it from the well and
placing it in the tanks); Spruce River Coal Co. v. Valco Coal Co., 95W. Va. 69, 120 S.E. 302 (1923) (value of coal after it was taken from
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deliberate and willful appropriator, however, must pay the value
at the mouth of the pit, or sometimes its value when prepared
and loaded in cars for final marketing, or even the amount of
the proceeds realized by the wrongdoer, 52 without recompense
for his labor and disbursements in extracting, lifting and processing it. 53
mine or loaded on cars, less expense of severance); notes, 7 A. L. R.

908; 23 A. L. R. 193.
If the plaintiff, the owner, was himself equipped with plant and
force to conduct mining operations, by which he could have extracted
the ore if defendant had not, the defendant should only be given credit
for those expenses which he has saved the plaintiff from incurring.
Even if the plaintiff was not thus equipped, the defendant seemingly
should not be able to charge against the product of another's land,
the cost of maintaining his plant and organization, and if this is correct, no "overhead" charges should be deducted, See Clark-Montana
Realty Co. v. Butte and Superior Copper Co., 233 Fed. 547, 577(23)
(D. C., Montana, 1916) (accounting in equity for plaintiff's ore, mined
and milled by defendant; only direct expense of mining, milling, and
moving allowed; no deduction for "general expense" of plant and
force); St. Clair v. Cash Gold Mining and Milling Co., 9 Colo. App. 235,
47 Pac. 466 (1897) (expense of running levels, etc., to reach the vein
from which ore extracted not allowed, but only the expense of digging,
tramming and hoisting the ore actually taken). See notes (42) and
(45), supra.
5 If the action is based upon the theory of trespass or trover at
law, the value at the pit-mouth or when ready for shipping will be
taken, but if the plaintiff by seeking an- injunction or otherwise, can
claim an equitable accounting, he can recover the proceeds realized
by the defendant. See cases cited in n. 53.
5'Big Sespe Oil Co. v. Cochran, 276 Fed. 216(10) (C. C. A., Cal.,
1921) (willful trespasser who operated oil wells on plaintiff's land,
liable on accounting in equity, for proceeds of oil produced, with no
deduction except for taxes paid on the property); Elkhorn-HazardCoal
Co. v. Kentucky River Coal Corp., 20 Fed. (2d) 67(12) (C. C. A. Ky.,
1927) (value of coal at pit-mouth with no credit for labor and expense
of mining and lifting); Lightner Mining Co. v. Lane, 161 Cal. 689, 120
Dec. 777, Ann. C. 10130 1093 (mine-owner through underground openings removes ore from adjoining land; chargeable with value of mineral after reduction with no deduction for mining and milling);
Thompson v. Dentzell, 232 Ky. 755, 24 S. W. (2d) 607 (1930) (value of
coal at place taken, no deduction); Tracey v. Athens and Pomeroy Coal
and Land Co., 115 Ohio St. 298, 152 N. E. 641 (1926) (value of coal at
mouth of mine); Pittsburgh and W.. Va. Gas Co. v. Pentress Gas Co.,
84 W. Va. 449, 100 S. E. 296, 7 A. L. R. 901 (1919), Crane's Case on
Damages, 291 (accounting in equity; trespasser held chargeable with
proceeds of oil, with interest with no deduction for cost of producing
and marketing but with allowance for royalty paid which plaintiff
would have had to pay). Where the defendant's willful wrong consists
not in taking, but in rendering unminable, the ore or coal under plaintiff's land, the same measure is not applied. New Coronado Coal Co. v.
Jasper, 144 Ark. 58, 222 S. W. 22(10) (1920) (profits, here certainly
ascertainable, which plaintiff would .have derived from the coal
rendered unminable); Pan Coal Co. v. Garland .Pocahontas Coal Co.,,

L. J.-8
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Classifying trespassers as "innocent" and "willful" is
easy, but actually distinguishing the sheep from the goat is not
so easy. The trespasser has the burden of producing evidence
of his good-faith. 54 An honest mistake as to the boundary
line,5 5 or a reasonable belief that an agent, in fact unauthorized,
has power to permit the entry,50 and even an honest mistake as
to the legal consequences of known facts, when such mistake
is induced by the advice of reputable counsel; 57 may support the
claim of innocence. Of course, if the conduct of the owner appears acquiescent, this may help to absolve the trespasser of
willfulness.5 8 Moreover, while it has been held that if the trespasser knows the facts upon which the true owner's rights are
based, his mistaken belief that his own title is superior in law
does not constitute "good faith", 5 9 results reached in other cases
97 W. Va. 368, 125 S. E. 226(11) (1924) (value in place, plus punitive
damages if malicious).
One who enters in good faith and begins mining operations, but
holds over after he learns that his title is invalid, becomes then a willful trespasser, and should ordinarily be refused reimbursement for the
cost of his operations after notice, but it is held in Oklahoma that in
the case of oil and gas a different result should be reached, if the situation is such that if the trespasser closes down the well, the oil may be
drained away or the well ruined by salt water. Barnes v. Winona Oil
Co., 83 Okla. 253, 200 Pac. 985, 23 A. L. R. 189 (1921), Bauer's Cases
on Damages (2d ed.) 573.
"Liberty Bell Gold Mining Co. v. Smuggler-Union Mining Co., 122
C. C. A. 113, 203 Fed. 795 (1913); Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Penny,
97 C. C. A. 600, 173 Fed. 340 (1929); Elkhorn-Hogard Coal Co. v. Kentucky River Coal Co., 20 Fed. (2d) 67(9) (C. C. A., Ky., 1927). But it
has been held that the trespasser is not required to plead his good
faith. United States v. Homestake Mining Co., 54 C. C. A. 303, 117 Fed.
481, 490 (1902).
51See, for example, Bennett Jellico Coal Co. v. East Jellico Coal Co.,
152 Ky. 838, 154 S. W. 922 (1913).
0Pan Coal Co. v. Garland Pocahontas Coal Co., 97 W. Va. 368, 125
S. E. 226(10) (1924) (question of mine superintendent's authority to
make agreement allowing another mining company to take coal).
" United States v. Homestake Mining Co., 54 C. C. A. 303, 117 Fed.
481, 488 (1902) (timber cut by mining company from forest preserve
under the coal agreement made by company's counsel with Secretary
of Interior, which agreement was not authorized by law); United
States v. Midway Northern Oil Co., 232 Fed. 619 (Dist. Ct., Calif.,
1916) (wells drilled and oil taken, on public lands, under mistaken
advice of counsel that president's order withdrawing lands from entry
was invalid).
"See Rock v. Belmar Contracting Co., 252 N. Y. S. 463(3) (Trial
term, Sup. Ct., 1930) (owner of land knowing of road contractor's
quarrying operations on his land without authority and failing to protest, precluded from enhanced damages).
"Pittsburgh and West Viriginia Gas Co. v. Pentress Gas Co., 84
W. Va. 449, 100 S. E. 296, 7 A. L. R. 901 (1919), Crane's Cases on Dam-
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suggest that this statement is too broad6" and that the question
of "good faith" as opposed to "willful defiance", may-hinge
upon the activity, or lack of activity of the owner in asserting
his claim. 6 ' The facts and legal implications upon which a
mining or timber claim is based may be exceedingly complex,
and the final outcome of litigation may be actually unpredictable. Good faith in going ahead with production in the face of
a known adverse claim, under such circumstances, is a ques8
tion of degree 62 upon which in jury cases the jury must pass.
The seemingly harsh treatment of those who appropriate
the product of the land of others, may be justified as an attempt
to so increase the risk of such conduct as to make it unprofitable,
a result which might not follow if the only liability were for
the market value of the thing appropriated with interest. This
reason may go so far as to justify the practice of those few
ages, 291 (senior oil leases of indefinite term were claimed invalid by
fee-owners, who made junior leases; junior leasees sued for injunction
against drilling by senior lessees, and this- injunction was granted by
trial court; pending appeal, junior lessees drilled and took oil; later,
the decree was reversed and senior leases declared valid; held, on
accounting in equity, that the junior lessees though honestly believing
in the validity of their leases were "'willful" trespassers, accountable
for proceeds of oil, without deduction).
See Pan Coal Co. v. Garland Pocahontas Co., 97 W. Va. 368, 125
S. E. 226, 231 (1924), in which the doctrine of the Pittsburgh and
West Virginia Gas Co. case, supra, n. 59, is questioned. U See Kahle v. Crown Oil Co., 180 Ind. 131, 100 N. E. 681 (1913)
(defendant drilled wells and, produced oil under a junior lease, which
he took relying on a decree which canceled prior lease, and not knowing that an appeal could be taken; the decree was reversed, but he
was held to be an "innocent" trespasser; compare with result in Pittsburgh and West Virginia Coal Co. case, supra, n. 59, in which the
trespasser knew, at the time of drilling that the adverse claims would
be strenuously contested to the last); United States v. Midway Northern
Oil Co., 232 Fed. 619, 632 (Dist. Ct., Calif., 1916) ("The government
agents and officers charged with the disposition of the public lands
knew of the possession and development of the properties, and made
no objection thereto, and while this does not estop the government
from now asserting title or right to the possession (Pine River Logging Co. v. U. S., 186 U. S. 279, 22 Sup. Ct. 920, 46 L. Ed. 1164), it
should not be overlooked by a court of equity in considering the character of the defendants' possession, or the damages which they should
be required to pay.") Cf. Williamson v. Chicago Mill and Lumber Corp.,
59 Fed. (2d) 918(6) (C. C. A., Ark., 1932) (corporation cutting and
removing timber, after warning, and with knowledge that *suit had
been brought against it to quiet title, held "willful" trespasser despite
belief that it had title).
6-*Trustees of Dartmouth College v. International Paper Co., 132
Fed. 92, 104 (Cir. Ct., N. H., 1904).
-Pan Coal Co. v. Garland Pocahontas Co., 97 W. Va., 368, 125 S. E.
226(10) (1924).
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courts who hold even the appropriator who has been able to
secure a finding that he was innocently mistaken in crossing
over the boundary-line, for the value of timber immediately
after cutting, 64 or coal at the pit-mouth, 65 with no deduction for
cutting or mining, since this small added hazard may discourage
those on the border-line of good faith from, taking a chance.
This policy finds expression also in the application here of the
practice of awarding exemplary damages for willful wrongs, 60
and even more pointedly in statutes, common in the timber and
coal states, by which one who in bad faith removes trees or minerals from another's land becomes liable for double or treble
damages 67 or other penalties. 68
2.

DISTINCTION BETwEEN COmPLETED AND CONTINUING INVASIONS OF THE LANDOWNER'S INTERESTS:

"PERMANENT

NUISANCE"

THE

DOCTRINE.

We have seen that for direct invasions of land, called trespasses, which have been completed in the past, damages are recovered once and for all, and are usually measured by the loss
See n. 44, supra.
See Alabama and Illinois cases, n. 48, supra.
Examples are Gowan v. Wisconsin-Alabama Lumber Co., 215 Ala.
231, 110 So. 31(6) (1926) (cutting timber); Barton Coal Co. v. Cox,
39 Md. 1, 30, 17 Am. Rep. 525 (1873) (mining coal); Baxley v. Barvwell Lumber Co., 113 S.C. 109, 101 S.E. 646 (1919) (cutting timber
valuable for plantation). But it will be found that exemplary damages
are actually very rarely awarded for taking minerals or timber in
cases where the defendant is held liable for the enhanced value of
the product. Would this be double punishment?
"ISuch statutes exist in Arkansas (Crawford and Moses' Dig., See.
10320) (timber); California (Code Civ. Prac., Sec. 733) (timber);
Michigan (Comp. L., 1929, Sec. 15124) (timber, ore, plants, etc.);
Minnesota (Gen. Stats. 1923, Sec. 9396) (timber and other products of
soil); Missouri (Rev. Stats. 1929, See. 3291) (timber, minerals, plants,
etc.); Oklahoma (Gen. L., 1921, Sec. 6007) (timber); Oregon (Code,
1930, Sec. 5-306) (timber);Pennsylvania (Stats., 1920, Sec. 11239, Sec.
15605, timber, minerals, etc.); Vermont (Gen. L., 1917, Sec. 6956);
Washington (Rem. Code, 1922, Sec. 939) (timber). The foregoing list
is not exhaustive; see Dec. and Curr. Dig., Trespass, Secs. 60, 61.
It has been held that a claim for treble damages under a state
statute, for cutting timber, being penal, is not enforcible in a suit in
equity in the Federal Court. Williamson v. Chicago Mill and Lumber
Corp., 59 Fed. (2d) 918(14) (C. C. A. Ark., 1932).
',8Examples are Alabama
(Code, 1923, Sec. 10371); Mississippi
(Hem. Code, Sec. 3246); New Hampshire (Pub. St., 1901, 0. 244); and
New Jersey (4 Comp. St., 1910, p. 5396, Sec. 1), all relating to cutting
timber. Decisions under these statutes are collected in Dec. and Curr.
Dig., Trespass, Sec. 63.
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in the value of the land for sale or use; or the loss of the value
of any products, such as timber, coal, or oil, taken or destroyed. 9 The same practice obtains, of course, if the land has
been injured by some less direct - disturbance of the physical
situation, as when fumes or cement dust, or seepages of oil, have
,come upon the land, or sewage has been deposited upon it, or
floods of water have been diverted over it. For any such invasion, if a cause of action arises, all injury, past and prospec-tive, may be recovered once and for all by the owner.7 0 Indeed,
1 See next previous section.
"Indiana .Pipe Line Co. v. Christensen, 188 Ind. 400, 123 N. E.
789(3) (1919) (injury to land from oil which escaped from pipe line:
held, plaintiff would be entitled to recover all future damage from
past leakage, but not sufficient evidence of lasting injury to soil to
justify award of diminution in value of land; illuminating opinion by
Lairy, C. J.); Chicago, K. & W. R. Co., 45 Kan. 110, 25 Pac. 576 (1891)
(excavation on plaintiff's land by defendant; instruction allowing
-diminution in market value of land, approved); Rockland Water Co. v.
Tillson, 69 Me. 255 (1879) (injury to easement for carrying water
across land, by undermining pipe; plaintiff recovers not merely past
cost of repairs, but all prospective damage therefrom); Conlon v.
McGraw, 66 Mich. 194, 33 N. W. 388(1) (1887) (action by tenant for
-destruction of wall: plaintiff not limited to damage accruing before
action, but recovers prospective loss of profits to end of term). Cf.
California Orange Co. v. Riverside Portland Cement Co., 50 Calif. App.
.522, 195 Pac. 694 (1920) (damage to orange grofe, due to deposit of
cement dust on trees; not confined to loss in crops before suit, but
can recover for later loss due to lasting effect of original deposit);
Greene v. Gertz, 36 R. L 105, 89 AtI. 16(3) (1913) (for past flooding
of plaintiff's land, he can recover for damages accruing after the action
was brought).
Similarly, it would seem that if the defendant encroaches upon
-plaintiff's land by building over the line, or piling dirt, rocks or refuse
upon it, he should be liable for a single recovery of all damages, as
for a completed wrong, since he is not privileged to enter upon the
land to remove the object and- hence his wrong is not continuing.
Finley v. Hershey, 41 Ia. 389 (1875) (filling up plaintiff's pond);
Ziebarth v. Wye, 42 Minn. 541, 44 N. W. 1027 (1890) (embankment
built on plaintiff's land); Blankenship v. Kansas Explorations, Inc.,
325 Mo. 998, 30 S. W. (2d) 471(4) (1930) (filling up plaintiff's mill
pond by sludge from defendant's mine; plaintiff can recover depreciation in value of his land, provided cost of removal is
.shown to be greater than amount of depreciation in value of his land;
Cherry v. Lake Drummond Canal Co., 140 N. C. 422, 53 S.E. 138, 111
Am. St. Rep. 850 (1906) (deposit of sand and mud). See Kafka v.
lBozio, 191 Cal. 746,'218 Pac. 753, 29 A. L. R. 833 (1923) with annotation. But in England and some of the states successive actions for
the mere loss of use, or of rental value, up to the time of suit are
allowed, for such encroachments. Holmes v. Wilson, 10 A. and E. 503,
113 Eng. Reprint 190 (1839); Milton v. Puffer, 207 Mass. 416, 93 N. E.
634 (1911). And in some states a single recovery for the depreciation in value, or cost of removal has been denied. McGann v. Hamilton,
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it is clear that the allowance of damages measured by the depreciation in the value of the land is itself a form of compensation for future harm. It is based on the assumption that the
injurious change in the condition of the land, will diminisb
its availability for sale or use in the future.
Very frequently, however, the landowner becomes the victim of a situation in which his land is subjected not to one invasion merely, but to a succession of disturbances or invasions.
His neighbor may repeatedly drive cattle across his land, or the
neighbor may carry on blasting in a mine or quarry, or may
have erected a dam or efibankment which brings successive
seasonal floods over the land, or he may be operating a coalchute, a smelter, a packing-house, or a sewage-disposal plant, so.
that from day to day the land is invaded by dust, fumes, odors,
or vibrations to such an extent as to be actionable as a nuisance.
For such repeated trespasses and continuing nuisances, under
the traditional common-law view, successive causes of action.
arise with each invasion or disturbance of the land, and damages could be given only for those causes of action which had
arisen before the commencement of the action.7 1
MWile the
plaintiff could include in his complaint all of the invasions.
which had occurred before he brought suit, and could recover all
damages past and prospective, for those invasions, 7 - he could
recover nothing for any invasions or disturbances of the land
after the institution of suit and before trial, 73 and nothing for58 Conn. 69, 19 Ati. 376 (1890) (wall); Stowers v. Gilbert, 156.N. Y.
600, 51 N. E. 282 (1898) (wall); Lyons v. Fairmont Real Estate Co.,
71 W. Va. 754, 77 S. E. 525 (1913) (large stone fill). See Dec. and'
Curr. Dig., Trespass, Sec. 50; 3 Sedgwick, Damages, 924a (9th ed.,
1920); 63 C. J. 1051, Sec. 253.
"Battishifl v. Reed, 18 C. B. 696, 139 Eng. Reprint, 1544 (1856)
(action by reversioner against neighboring owner who had built overhanging eaves; held, plaintiff cannot recover diminution in value of*
his property; repeated actions for continuance of nuisance allowable);
Uine v. X. Y. Central and H. R. R. Co., 101 N. Y. 98, 4 N. P. 536, 54
Am. Rep. 661 (1886) (injury to abutting property by construction of'
railway in street; permanent damages not recoverable, but successive
actions may be brought for past damage; *reviewing decisions); Bartlett v. Grasselli Chem. Co., 92 W. Va. 445, 115 S.E. 451, 27 A. L. R.
54 (1922) (action for damages for nuisance 6reated by operation ofsmelting furnace; held, even where both parties acquiesce, the court
may not award damages as for a permanent nuisance, but only for the
past impairment of the enjoyment of the land); 1 Sedgwick, Damages,
Sec. 91-95 (9th ed., 1920) ; Dec. and Curr. Dig., Nuisance, Sec. 50 (3) (4)..
I See n. 70, supra.
7 This is well illustrated by W. K. Fairbank Co. v. Bahre, 213 Ill.
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the diminution in the value of his land due to the prospect that
it would be subjected to the continuance of the trespasses or the
nuisance in the future.7 4 It was thought that it would be unfair
to assess compensation upon the assumption that the offending
conduct would continue indefinitely since the defendant might
in fact cease from inflicting further harm.
The result of this rule is that the plaintiff is forced to
bring successive actions for the past invasions; unless he can
secure an abatement of the nuisance, or an injunction. The
principal elements of damages in such actions are, in cases of
nuisance, 75 the inconvenience and the physical discomfort and
injury to health suffered by the plaintiff, if he is the occupant,
76
value 77 of
and his family and the diminuation in the rental
636, 73 N. E. 322(3) (1905). In that case the defendant had deposited
a large amount of soap stock upon its premises adjoining those of the
plaintiff, who thereafter -brought an action as for a nuisance, and
alleged that the odors emanating therefrom polluted-the air and injured the health of the occupants. The trial court admitted evidence
of the pollution of the air, after the commencement of the action, and
this was held to be erroneous. The court properly distinguished the
case of Chicago & X. W. R. Co. v. Hoag, 90 Ill. 339 (1878), in which,
before action, the defendant flooded the plaintiff's premises with waste
water which froze, and it was held that the plaintiff could recover
for inconvenience due to the fact that the ice melted after the suit
was brought, and made the premises muddy. In one case the invasion
of the plaintiff's premises by odors after the suit ivas excluded. In
the other, the consequences of an invasfon by water before suit, were
admitted. However, if the claim for past damage arises in equity
(which gives complete relief in suits for injunction by giving compensation) the award will cover all injury sustained down to the time of
trial. Gerow v. Village of Liberty, 106 App. Div. 357, 94 N. Y. S. 949(1)
(1905). And in some states, even in actions for damages alone, the
sensible and practicable chancery rule is followed. Webb v. VirginiaCarolina Chem. Co., 170 N. C. 662, 87 S. E. 633 (1916); Caomminge v.
Stevenson, 76 Tex. 42, 13 S. W. 556 (1890). In England, the same restilt is reached under a rule of court. Hole v. Chard Union (18,94), 1
Ch.293. Cases are collected in Dec. and Curr. Dig., Nuisance, Sec. 50 (3).
71See n. 71, supra.
15See Dec. and Curr. Dig., Nuisance, Sec. 50(1); 3 Sedgwick,
Damages, Sec. 948 (9th ed., 1920).
76Central Georgia Power Co. 1. Pope, 141 Ga. 186, 80 S. E. 642,
L. R. A. 1916D, 358 (annoyance and discomfort from stagnant water in
neighboring land); Chicago-Virden Coal Co. v. Wilson, 67 Ill. App. 443
(1896) (where occupant of home sues for nuisance from railway
smoke, etc., not limited to loss of rental value, but may recover for
discomfort); McCracgen v. 'Swift & Co., 265 S. W. 91 (Mo., 1924)
(odors from poultry yard; plaintiff occupant of neighboring apartment,
not limited to loss in rental value but may recover for impairment
of the eiijoyment of the home by the family).
It is customary when suit is brought by the head of the household
for the plaintiff to allege generally the discomfort to himself and the
members of his family, and for this to be submitted generally as an
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the land or the impairment of its enjoyment 7s during the period
for which the nuisance has endured up to the time the action
was brought, or the actual loss of crops 79 or other products of
the land or income from an established business conducted
element of damages. See Daniel v. Ft. Worth & R. G. Ry. Co., 96 Tex.
327, 72 S. W. 578 (1903); 46 C. J. 827, Sec. 501. This is practical, and
avoids a multiplicity of trivial claims by the members of the family.
But in case of actual injury to the health of a member of the family,
such person should sue, and the head of the house would have only
the parent's or husband's right as in other cases of personal injury to
recover for expenses incurred and loss of services. U. S. Smelting Co.
v. Sisam, 112 C. C. A. 37, 191 Fed. 293, 37 L. R. A. N. S. 976 (1911'
(hisband may recover for discomfort of wife and for the consequences
to himself of his wife's sickness, due to fumes from smelter, and this
despite code iirovisions entitling the wife to recover for her own personal injuries); Millett v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Co., 145 Minn. 475.
177 N. W. 641, 179 N. W. 682 (1920) (dictum: wife owning home may
recover not only for diminshed value of its use, but also for discomfort of herself and for the discomfort and illness of the other memberz
of family, so far as they affect .her). The limitation upon the rule
which" allows the head of the family to recover for the discomfort o7
its members, imnlied by the last two cases, to the effect that he can
recover only for the consequences to himself of such discomfort, i,impractical and over-refined.
While the same condition which inflicts personal discomfort upo.
the owner-occupant and his family, also diminishes the rental value othe land, or lessens the value of its use and enjoyment, yet recovery
for lessened rental value or diminished value of use, does not preclude
recovery for personal discomfort. Millett v. Minnesota Crushed Stonea
Co., supra, and numerous cases cited therein. In Kentucky, however,
this is cQnsidered a double recovery, and proof of discomfort is allowed].
but only as evidence of loss of rental value or impairment of enjoyment.
Compensation for mental anguish in nuisance cases, except so far
as this might be an accompaniment of the plaintiff's own physical injury or sickness, is denied. City of Richmond v. Wright. 151 lfa. 9F4
145 S. E. 732 (1928) (flooding residence, due to insufficient culvert),
comment, 15 Va. L. Rev. 714; Brookside Pratt Min. Co., 196 Ala. 110.
72 So. 18(18) (1916) (flowage: anxiety over illness of children). .
willful or wanton trespass to land may be ground for recovery for
mental suffering, however. M. J. Rose Co. v. Lowery, 33 Oho App. 43'
169 N. E. 716 (1929); and see Quillen v. Schimpf, 133 Ore. 531, 291 Pac.
1009 (1930); comment, 16 Ia. L. Rev. 276.
" The measure is loss of rental value if the land is rented or for
rent, and the diminution of the value of the use, if occupied by the
owner. Cumberland Torpedo Co. v. Gaines, 201 Ky. 88, 255 S. W. 104,3
(1923); see Dec. and Curr. Dig., Nuisance, Sec. 50 (1) (2).
IsMillett v. Minneosta Crushed Stone bo., 145 Minn.-475, 177 N. W.
641, 179 N. W. 682 (1920); McCracken v. Swift & Co., 265 S&W. 91
(Mo., 1924).
"California Orange Co. v. Riverside Portland Cement Co., 50 Cal.
App. 522, 195 Pac. 694 (19 0) (injury to orange crops from cement
dust). Vautier v. Atlantic Refining Co., 231 Pa. 8, 79 Atl. 814 (1911)
(injury to crops due to fumes from oil refinery).
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there,80 when suit is brought by the occupant. In addition, the
plaintiff may recover any reasonable expenses which he has incurred on account of the nuisance,81 or which are necessary to be
incurred, to prevent, reduce, or abate the nuisance.8 2 This form
,of relief, by successive actions for invasions occurring, before
suit, has been supplemented through the invention by American
courts of the conception of a "permanent" nuisance, for which
-a single action may be brought for the entire damages which
the plaintiff will suffer in future from the harmful structure or
enterprise.8 3
This doctrine seems to trace its origin to the case of The
Town of Troy v. The Cheshire Rail Road Company,84 decided
in New Hampshire in 1851. This was an action by the town
which was charged with the duty of maintaining the highway,
for its obstruction by the company through building the railroad
across it. It was held that the town was entitled to recover any
reasonable expenses necessary to be incurred to render the highway passable, or to lay out a new one, if the old one had been
rendered unusable, and that such recovery was allowable even
though no money had actually been spent therefor. Overruling
the defendant's contention that this would violate the rule that
damages must be limited to claims arising before the action was
brought, the court said:
"Wherever the nuisance is of such a character, that its continuance
ICCentral Georgia Power Co. v. TV. C. Pope, 141 Ga. 136, 80 S.E.
642(4), L. R. A. 1916D, 358 (recognizing rule, but holding that storeowner cannot recover for the loss of customers who were caused to
move away from the community by the nuisance). Cf. RibbI~t v.
Cambria Steel Co., 251 Pa. 253, 96 Atl. 649 (1916) (damaged for having
to abandon dairy business unauthorized, where plaintiff failed to
p-rove gross income of business, and estimated expenses itemized as,
far as1 possible).
- Loughr'an v. Des Moines, 72 Ia. 382, 34 N. W. 172(2) (1887) (expenses of sickness); 46 C. J. 825, n. 78.
a San Antoino v. Mackey, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 145, 54 S. W. 33 (1899);
3 Sedgwick, Damages, Sec. 948(5) (9th ed., 1920).
8 Cases on the damage problems centering around the "permanent
nuisance" doctrine are collected in Dec. and Curr. Dig., Nuisance, See.
50, Trespass, Sec. 51, and Eminent Domain, Secs. 140, 141, 302, 30.1,
See also, 4 Sutherland, Damages, Sees. 1038-1047 (4th ed., 1916); annotation, "character of nuisance as continuing; when cause of action
arises; successive actions," L. R. A. 1916E, 997; McCormick, "Damages
for Anticipated Injury to Land," 37 Harv. L. Rev. 574 (1924); H. F.
Goodrich, "Permanent Structures and Continuing Injuries-the iowa
'Rule," 4 Ia. L. Bull.-65 (1918).
125 N. H. 83, 55 Am. Dec. 177 (1851).

KINTUCKY LAw JOURNA
is necessarily an injury, and where it is of a permanent character, thatwill continue without change from any cause but human labor, there,
the damage is an original damage, and -may be at once fully compensated, since the injured person has no means to compel the individual doing the wrong, to apply the labor necessary to remove the
cause of injury, and can only cause it to be done, if at all, by the expenditure of his own means.
'But where the continuance of such act is not necessarily injuriGus,
and where it is (not) necessarily of a permanent character, but may,
or may not be, injurious, or may, or may not be, continued, there theinjury, to be compensated in a suit, is only the damage that has happened. . . . The railroad is, in its nature and design, and use, a
permanent structure, which cannot be assumed to be liable to change;
the appropriation of the roadway and materials to the use of the railroad, is therefore a permanent appropriation; the use of the land set
apart to be used as a highway, by the railioi-d company for the use of
their track, is a permanent diversion of that property, to that new use,.
and a permanent dispossession of the town of it, as the place on which,
to maintain the highway. The injury done to the town is then a
permanent injury, at once done by the construction of the railroad,,
which is dependent upon no contingency, of which the law can take
notice, and for the injury thus done to them, they are entitled to recover at once their reasonable damages."' -

These phrases have often been quoted in later decisions,
which have greatly extended the notion of- a "permanent"
nuisance. This first case, it will be noted, was closely analogous.
to the actions for erecting a structure on another's land, which
is a trespass and for which entire damages can be given on the
ground that it is a completed wrong. 6 The holding was speedily and widely applied to cases of railway embankments causing
overflows upon neighboring land,8 7 and to other dams and embankments which caused the flooding of near-by land. The
doctrine found ready acceptance in all these cases since they
are situations in which the harm results from the 6riginal construction, without any further activity by the defendant, and
since, in most instances the dams and embankments are constructed by railroads or cities as public or semi-public work.
which usually last a long time.
Eventually, however, the doctrine was extended to situations.
where the nuisance is not a mere passive strzwture like a dam
or embankment, but where the harm flows from the defendant's
active operation of some factory, plant, or establishment. Here
23-1N. Er., at pp. 102, 103, 104.
See n. 70, suPra.
An example is Stodghi1l V. Chicago, B. & Q. R?. Co., 53 Ia. 341,
N. W. 495 (1880), Crane's Cases on Damages, 343. See also Payne v.
Lanham, 198 Ky. 564, 249 S. W. 995 (1923), and comment thereon in.
8 Minn. L. Rev. 259.
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again the offending enterprises are frequently public or semipublic in character, as in eases of injuries inflicted upon neighbors by the noise and smoke from the operation of railway coalchutes, 88 or by the odors or the stream-pollution caused bymunicipal sewage-disposal plants. 89 Some courts have gone evenfurther, however, and have. allowed recovery of entire damages.
for a "permanent" nuisance, even in cases where the nuisanceis incident to the operation of a private business not vested witk
the power of eminent domain, such as- an ice-factory, 90 a cementplant, 91 or an establishment for the manufacture of explosives
Moreover, the use of the doctrine is not limited to cases of nuisances strictly, but is generally applied with equal facility to.
cases of obstruction of easements, or of violation of landowners"
rights in streams and waters. 92
In considering the question of when prospective damageg.
as for a permanent nuisance will be allowed, it will be useful to
mention some of the possible situations:
(1) The defendant may have acquired the lawful, powerto maintain the injurious structure, or establishmen by eminentdomain proceedings.
(2) The defendant may be authorized by statute to acquire this right, by eminent domain proceedings, but may have
neglected to do so.
(3) The injury may be caused by the negligent or unlawful construction or operation of a public or semi-public enterprise such as a defective city sewer-system, or a railway embankment with insufficient culverts.
-(4) The injurious structure or operation may not be pro-.
tected by the power of eminent domain, and yet it may be suchthat a court of equity would refuse to enjoin its 'continuance,.
88 Missoui Pao. R. Co. v. Davis, 186 Ark. 401, 53 S. W. (2d) 851

(1932), and see comment thereon by H. Horrow in 27 Ift. L. Rev. 953.
Mills v. City of Greenville, 160 S. C. 10, 158 S.E. 1II
Conestee
C,

(1931); and see City of Harrisonville v. Dickson Clay Mfg. Co., 289.
U. S. 334, 53 Sup. Ct. 602, 77 L. Ed. 1208 (1933).
S*outhern Ice & Utilities Co. v. Bryan, 58 S.W. (2d) 920 (Ark.,.
1933).
"1 Hardin v. Olympic Portland Cement Co., 89 Wash. 320, 154 Pac.
450 (1916).
92InternationalShoe Co. v. Gibbs, 183 Ark. 539, 36 S.W. (2d) 960,

(1931)

(pollution of stream by septic tank); Rider v. York Haven

Water & Power Co., 251 Pa. 18, 95 Atl. 803 (1915) (diversion of water).
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-on the grounds that such injunction would be against the publip
interest.
(5)
The injury may be caused by a passive structure, not
connected with any public enterprise but relatively permanent
-inphysical character.
(6) The injury may proceed from the active operation of'
'some factory or establishment, not "affected with a public in-ter'st", but substantial and apparently "permanent", such as
.,a shoe-factory, or a textile-mill.
(7) The injury may emanate from a relatively flimsy
,structure or a seemingly transient enterprise.
In respect to their willingness to allow damages as for a
4'permanent nuisance", the courts may be roughly classified
into these groups:
(a) Those which consistently refuse to give prospective
,damages based on the assumption that an injurious condition in
the nature of a nuisance or continuing trespass will continue
in future. Under this view, even if the enterprise is a public
one, damages for future, anticipated injury may be collected,
if at all, only by proceedings authorized under the eminent
-domain statutes; or occasionally entire, prospective damages
93
may be given in equity, in lieu of an injunction. England,
94
5
"
New York, Massachusetts, and California, are included in
-this group.
'1Battishill v. Reed, 13 C. B. 696, 139 Eng. Reprint 1544 (1856), ex.
presses the traditional view that prospective damages will not be given
-for a nuisance. But in suits for injunction, the court is empowered
,even in case of a private enterprise constituting a nuisance, to give
prospective damages in lieu of an injunction, and thus in effect to
license the continuance of the nuisance. Leeds lndnstrial Co-Operative Soc. v. Slack, (1924) A. C. 851 (H. L.) (under Lord Cairns Act,
21 and 22 Vict. C. 27, S. 2).
"'Damages for prospective injury were held not to be recoverable
in Urine v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 101 N. Y. 109, 4 N. E. 536, 54 Am.
Rep. 661 (1886) (alleged improper construction of railway embankmront iii street); Reed V.State, 108 N. Y. 407, 15 N. E. 735 (1888) (dam
improperly constructed, causing recurrent flooding of plaintiff's land).
-Butin the elevated railroad cases, where abutting owners sued for injunction, the defendant was allowed to pay permanent damages instead, on the ground that it could acquire the right to build and oporate its structure, by eminent domain proceedings. Poppenheim v.
Metropoitan Elevated R. Co., 128 N. Y. 436, 28 N. E. 518 (1891).
9Odworth v. City of Lynn, 153 Mass. 53, 26 N. E. 229, 10 L. R. A.
210, 34 Am. St. R. 92 (1891) (in action for improper construction of
-city reservoir and dam, recurrently flooding plaintiff's adjoining land,
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(b) Those which allow prospective damages as for a per-manent nuisance, in all cases in which the defendant's injurious.
structure, or plant, or injurious method of construction or operation, is not subject to be abated or enjoined, because authorized
by eminent domain statutes. 97 Among these are Illinois, 5 and.
North Carolina, 9 9 and probably Indiana, Kentucky, South Carolina, Tennessee and Oklahoma.1 00 However, if the injury is.
caused by the negligent, unlawful, or improper construction or
operation, of the enterprise, even though it is a public one, then
since this may well be remedied in future, damages for the
prospective continuance of the wrong, will not be awarded by
this group of courts. 10 1 This test of whether the defendant's;
plaintiff cannot recover for prospective flooding; if construction and
operation were not improper or negligent plaintiff's only remedy would
be by petition, under eminent domain statute).
"9Coats v. Atchison, Topeka and S. F. R. Co., -1 Cal. App. 441, 82
Pac. 640 (1905) (railroad occupying street, liable7 to abutting owner
not for depreciation in value of lot, but only in recurring actions for
past damage); 2 Cal. L. Rev. 248.
"The privilege which such statutes give, of inflicting sibstantial
and unusual iiconvenience upon neighboring occupants of land, can
be accorded to public utilities. Bartlett v. -rasselli Chem. Co., 92 W
Va. 445, 115 S. E. 451, 27 A. L. R. 54 (1922). If the neighboring landowner is threatened with special damage by the public improvement orplant, as in cases where his land may be subjected to flodding by a
dam, he may be called in, under same eminent domain statutes, to
assert his claim for prospective injury in the condemnation proceedings, but if none of his land is actually "taken," he will ordinarily not
have such opportunity in those proceedings. These courts, in effect,
permit him to come in later, when the dam or other imnrovement is.
built, and the injury apparent, to sue for his damage, once and for all.
Usually this is permitted also, in cases where, although the defendant
has not actually secured specific authority for its enterprise by eminent
domain proceedings, the situation and the nature of the enterprise, is
such that it could do so, if it were threatened with abatement. Riderv. York Haven -Water& Power Co., 251 Pa. 18, 95 At. 803 (1915)
(erection of dam by water company, which had power of eminent domain but had not taken condemnation proceedings).
".Chicago and E. . R. Co. v. Loeb, 118 Ill. 203, 8 N. E. 460 (1884)'
(damages from proper operation of railway through city, from smoke
and cinders, recoverable once and for all by occupant of adjoining land,
at beginning of operation, and subsequent purchaser of adjoining land
has no cause of action); Cotello v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 298 Ill. 243,
131 N. E. 591(1) (1921) (recovery allowed for deDreciation in value!
of adjoining land, from lawful operation of railway coal chute).
"Rhodes v. City of Durham, 165 N. C. 679, 81 S. E. 938(2) (1914)
(city sewage system polluting stream; held, either the plaintiff or the
defendant may demand that entire damages be awarded, if the enterprise Is public and non-abatable). The North Carolina cases are col-lected in a note by C. P. Rouse, in 7 N. C. L. Rev. 464.
"'See cases in next two notes.
"Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Wachter, 123 Ill. 440, 15 N. E. 279(2) (1888).
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,.continuance of the injury is wrongful, precludes this group also
from: allowing damages for prospective injury against any
purely private business establishment.' 0 2 It seems also that in
-cases 'of class (4) mentioned above, when the injurious situation
is technically a continuing hiuisance or trespass, but where a
court of ectuity would decline to enjoin the continuance, on the
.ground that the harm to the public or the hardship on the defendant from such injunction would outweigh the injury to the
.plaintiff,10 3 then the equity court in the injunction suit should
(successive actions may be maintained for flooding due to maintenance
lby railroad of embankment with insufficient culverts, but see Strange
v. Cleveland, 0. 0. & St. L. R. Co., 245 Ill. 246, 91 N. E. 1036 p1910),
holding in a- similar situation that the plaintiff may elect to sue for
permanent damages; Stein v. 07. & 0. R. Co., 132 Ky. 322, 116 S. W. 733
(1909) (railway blocking abutter%s access -by embankment lawfully
erected, liable 'or permanent damages, but for unlawfully changing
grade of street, successiv6 recoveries proper; see comment, 9 Cal. L.
'-Rev. 538); Perry v. Norfolk Southern R. Co., 171 N. C. 38, 87 S. E: 948
(1916) (similar to last).; City of-Ardmore v, Orr, " Okla 305, 129 Pac.
867(5) (1913) (negligently constructed storm sewers, insufficient to
carry off surface waters). Oonestee Mills v. City of Greenville, 160
-S. C. 10, 158 S. E. 113(8) (1931) (pollution of stream by-negligent op-eration of city sewage system constructed under statutory authority,
held continuing nuisance, not a "permanent" one, and hence limitations did not begin to run at time of construction, against claims for
,subsequent pollution); Nashville v. Comar, 88 Tenn. 415, 12 S. W. 1027,
7 L. R. A. 465 (1890-) (prospective damages for depreciation in value
-of lot, not recoverable for unskillfully constructed sewer, defect leing
remediable; good opinion by Lurton, J.).
But in some decisions it is suggested that if the injury is caused
by defective construction of a public work, of a relatively permanent
-sort, and hence not easily remedied, that the plaintiff -will be allowed
entire, prospective damages, See dictum in Barlett v. Grasselli Chem.
'go., 92
W. Va. 445, 115 S. E. 451, 27 A; L. R. 54, 59 (1922).
12
Sloss-Sheffie J Steel and Iron Go. v. Mitchell, 161 Ala. 278, 49
So. 851(6) (1909) (obstruction of stream by steel mill; error to allow
-prospective damages measured by depreciation in plaintiff's land,
against private, abatable nuisauce); Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v.
-Compton, 142 Ill. 511, 32 N. E. 693, 18 L. R. A. 390, 34 Am. St. R. 92
(1892), Crane's Cases on Damages, 346 (injury from recurrent overflow of water on plaintiff's premises, due to improper construction of
roof of defendant's building; held, prospective damages for future overflow not recoverable); Turner v. Brooks, 151 Ky. 310, 151 S. W. 948,
L. R. A. 1916E, 958 (unlawful blocking of stream by railroad contractor
not ground for permanent damages, and-subsequent purchaser may
-sue for recurring injuries); Langley v. Staley Hosiery Mills Co., 194
N. C. 644, 140 S. E. 440 (1927) (pollution of stream by private concern,
error to award "permanent damages").
2o Some, but not all, courts accept these doctrines. The decisions
'are collected and discussed in City of Harrisonvi7le v. W. S. Dickey
'Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U. S. 334, 53 Sup. Ct. 602, 77 L. Ed. 1208 (1933)
(opinion by Brandeis, J.); Smith v. Staso Milling 0o., 18 Fed. (2d)
-736 (C. C. A., Vt., 1927) (opinion by Hand, J.); note, 36 Harv. L. Rev.
'211 (1923); see Dec. and Curr. Dig., Injunction, See. 24
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dssess permanent damages, 10 4 and a court of law on the same
grounds should give damages, once for all.
(c) In addition, there are some courts, chiefly in the midwest and south, which profess to make the allowance of entire
damages for a continuing nuisance depend upon the physical
"permanence" of the nuisance. This theory, originating in the

old case of The Town of Troy v. The Cheshire Railroad Company,
discussed above, 105 is an extension by the courts to a different
situation, often without the realization that it is different, of the

orthodox practice of allowing prospective damages for the probable future consequences" of a past and completed invasion of the
plaintiff's land.' 0
Some of these courts, adopting the criterion
of physical permanence would probably restrict the doctrine tc
instances of structures, such as dams or embankments, and would
not extend it to nuisances which proceed from active, continuing operations by the defendant.

In discussing physical "permanence,"

the emphasis is some-

times laid upon the lasting and substantial qualities of the
structure,10 7 in others upon the "permanence" of the injury'0 8
204Of course, if an injunction is granted, only damages for past
Injuries can be given. Meek v. De Latour, 2 Cal. App. 261, 83 Pac.
300(7) (1905). But When a continuing wrong is found but an injunction denied on grounds of public interest or comparative injury, some
courts have given a decree for past damages only. Smith v. Staso Miling Co., cited in next previous note. Others have provided for an injunction if the defendant fails to acquire the plaintiff's rights by purchase or eminent domain. Minto v. Salem Water, Light & Power Co.,
120 Ore. 202, 250 Pac. 722 (1926). But if the injurious situation will
continue Indefinitely, the assessment of permanent damages in lieu of
an injunction, will often be the most practical solution. City of HarriLonville v. W. S. Dickey Clay Co., cited in next previous note (bollution of stream by city's sewage disposal plant); city unable to finance
the purchase of auxiliary plant to correct the situation; decree for injunction and past damages reversed, decree ordered withholding injunction upon payment of the amount of the depreciation in value of plaintiff's land). Compare Sussex Land and Line Stock Co. v. Midwest Refining Co., 294 Fed. 597 (C. C. A., Wyo., 1923), where for pollution of
stream by oil wells, decree withheld injunction upon defendant's making periodical payments corresponding with future losses in rental
value.
205See note 84, supra.
"" See notes 69 and 70, supra.
10l Troy v. Cheshire R. R. Co., 23 N. H. 83, 102 (1851); Stodghill v.
.C. B. & Q. R. Co., 53 Ia. 341 (1880) (embankment); Martin v. Chicago
S. F. d C. R. Co., 47 Mo. App. 452 (1891) (embankment); International
& G. X. By. Co. v. Gieselman, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 123, 34 S. W. 658 (1896)
<ditch); Southern B. Co. v. White, 128 Va. 551, 104 S. E. 865, 870 (1920)
<embankment with inadequate culvert, permanent damages allowed).
'Harvey v. Mason City and Ft. D. R. Co., 129 Ia. 465, 105 N. W.
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and in others upon tle expense of abatement. 10 9 In either event,
the test is a rather vague one, as permanence is of course merely
a relative term. The result is a flexible technique which provides;
the courts with a freer choice between the traditional succes.irecoveries, and a single recovery once for all, than is furnished
by the test of the lawfulness under eminent domain statutes of
the defendant's structure or operations. The "permanent nuisance" technique is actually used principally in cases of public works such as railway embankments, and city reservoir dams.
It enables the court to settle the matter in one litigation, rather
than prolonging the controversy by successive actions, in those
cases where the alleged "defect" in construction of the public
work or "negligence" in its operation cannot be avoided at
reasonable expense. Occasionally, it is even used in cases of
substantial private enterprise, 1 o such as factories and mills,
where the plaintiff has chosen to sue for permanent damages. A
jury has little difficulty in determining whether the structure
859, 960 (1906) (merely occasional floodings of neighboring land by insufficient railway culvert not a "permanent injury," and hence successive actions are proper); Jones v. Sanitary Dist., M52Ill. 591, 97 N. E.
210 (5) (1912) (distinguishing permanent and intermittent flooding
and allowing recurrent actions for latter). The cause of action for
permanent damages does not arise, nor limitations begin to run, until
it becomes "certain and obvious" that injury will result from the structure. Bllerson Floral Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. Co., 149 Va. 809,
141 S. E. 834 (1928), and see L. R. A. 1916E, 1050, note.
9 Chicago, St. Louis & N. 0. R. Co. v. Bulock, 222 Ky. 10, 299
S. W. 1085 (1927) (action for flooding farm land, by blocking of railway drain ditches; held, since undisputed evidence showed that the
ditches could be altered to prevent recurrence of damage at slight
cost, trial judge properly refused to submit to jury the question of
their permanence; but it is to be observed that under the Kentucky
decisions seemingly only public ent3rprise having the power of eminent
domain can be regarded as "permanent"; see note 101 and 102, supra).
"'OInternationtl Sgoe Co. v. Gibbs, 183 Ark. 512, 26 S. W. (2d) 961

(1931)

(pollution of stream from sewage from aseptic tank; entire

damages allowed, because permanent nuisance; court also relied on
defendant's failure to object in trial court); ThackerV v. Union Portland Cement Co., 64 Utah 437, 231 Pac. 813 (1924) (continuing nuisance
from dust and smoke, not barred by limitations calculated from establishment of plant; but no error in submitting issue of permanent damages in absence of objection by defendant); Virginia Hot Springs Co.
v. McCray, 106 Va. 461, 56 S. E. 216, 220, 10 1. R. A. N. S. 465, 10 Ann.
C. 179 (1907) (pollution of stream by sewage system of large hotel;
held, cause of action is for permanent damages and dates from beginning of pollution, and is barred; nuisance may be "permanent,"
though not protected by eminent domain); Haan v. Heath, 161 Wash.
128, 296 Pac. 816(4) (1931) (permanent damages for nuisance committed by undertaking establishment).
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or injury was "permanent", but the injured landowner should
not be required to decide at his peril whether the judge and
jury will regard the situation as a "permanent" one.
The best solution and one which has been several times advocated by*judges and textwriters, but which as yet has only
been haltingly experimented with by the courts, is to make the
recovery ot entire, prospective damages a matter of the plaintiff's
election."1 ' It should be elective in the sense that successive
u See Strange v. Cleveland, U. C. d St. L. R. Co., 245 Ill. 246, 252,
91 N. E. 1036 (1910). This was a case of damage to. land from overflows caused by a railway embankment with insufficient culverts. The
defendant claimed that the defect was abatable and hence temporary,
and that it was error to award permanent damages. In rejecting this
contention the court said: "The apparent inconsistency in the decisions in cases of this character, we think, grows out of the fact that
in some of the cases no recovery was sought for a permanent injury
but the structure was treated by the landowner as temporary. It may
well be that he may have an election to treat the structure as permanent or temporary under ceftain circumstances. The rule is well stated
in Sutherland on Damages (Sec. 1046), as follows: 'The apparent discrepancy ii the American cases on this subject may, perhaps, be reduced by supposing that where the nuisance consists of a structure of
a permanent nature and intended by the defendant to be so, or of a
use or invasion of the plaintiff's property or a deprivation of some
benefit appurtenant to it for an indefinitely long period in the future,
the injured party has an option to complain of it as a permanent
Injury and recover damages for the whole time, estinating its duration
according to the defendant's purpose in creating or continuing it, or to
treat it as a temporary wrong, to be compensated for while it continues,-that is, until the act complained of becomes rightful by grant,
condemnation of property or ceases by abatement.'"
In Ottumwa v. Nicholson, 161 Ia. 473, 143 N. W. 439, L. R. A.
1916E, 983, the plaintiff sued for injury to her property resulting from
an insufficient culvert under the street which caused stagnant water
to collect. Permanent damages were assessed in the trial court. On
appeal the city contended that since the culvert was established before
the plaintiff purchased her property, and the claim for permanent
damages accrued then, she should not have recovered. Answering this
contention, the court said: "From the foregoing we deduce the rule
that if the condition wrongfully created is of a lasting character and
permanent, and damage results therefrom that is, the value of the
plaintiff's land is affected thereby, though all the damage has not yet
made itself manifest, the landowner may elect to tredt it as original
injury and recover damages, not only for the injury then caused in the
depreciation of the value of his land, but for all injury that appears
reasonably certain to result in the future as a proximate result of the
erection and continuance of the nuisance, and where he elects so to
treat the wrong, and a judgment is obtained in an action tried upon
that basis, such judgment will be a bar to any further claim on his
part for any further damages that may arise by reason of the continuance of the nuisance, but he is not required to so elect, for it is iot
always possible to anticipate and know what -damages may result from
the erection and continuance of the nuisance." See also Risher v.
Aoken Coal Co., 147 Ia. 459, 124 N. W. 764(2) (1910) where permalient

L. J.-9
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actions for past injury would be regarded as the normal remedy,
and only on the plaintiff's manifesting his election by claiming
them, would the cause of action for entire damages arise.11 2 The
doctrine that if the continuing nuisance is "permanent", the
plaintiff has only a single cause of action for entire damages is
pregnant with chances of injustice. If, for example, the plaintiff makes a mistake and sues for past injuries alone, thinking the
nuisance a temporary one, and recovers a judgment for a small
amount for past injuries, he would be barred from any further
action if the court in a later suit should determine that the nuisance was a "permanent" one.11 3 Moreover, under that doctrine, only the person who owned the injured land when the
permanent nuisance was established, can sue, and not a purchaser of the land. 114 Again, if the single action for entire
damages is the only remedy for a "permanent" nuisance, the
plaintiff, who ought certainly to be given a continuing possibility
of redress against a continuing wrong, finds himself blocked by
damages were allowed for maintenance of a large coal-pile, and it was

suggested that the plaintiff might elect to treat it as permanent or continuing; and see Thompson v. Illinois Central R. Co., 191 Ia. 35, 179
N. W. 191, 196 (1920); 6 Iowa L. Bull. 181.
It was intimated that the plaintiff had a similar election, in
Kafka v. Bozio, 191 Cal. 746, 218 Pac. 753, 756, 29 A. L. R. 833 (1923),
which was a case of an overhanging wall, treated as a continuing
nuisance, and a similar suggestion appears in Hockaday -V.Wortham,
22 Tex. Civ. App. 419, 54 S. W. 1094 (1900), which was an action for
maintenance of a cattle barn as a nuisance. See also, City of Texarkana
v. Rhyne, 56 S. W. (2d) 263 (1932).
It is usually held that, if both parties acquiesce it is proper for
the trial court to submit the issue of permanent damages, even- in case
of a private nuisance. International Shoe Co. v. Gibbs, 183 Ark. 512,
36 S. W. (2d) 961 (1931); Langley v. Staley Hosiery Mills Co., 194
N. C. 644, 140 S. E. 440 (1927). Contra: Bartlett v. Graselli Chem. Co.,
92 W. Va. 445, 115 S. E. 451, 27 A. L. R. 54 (1922). In North Carolina,
in case of an injury inflicted by a public enterprise, either party may
elect to have entire damages awarded. Rhodes v. Durham, 165 N. C.
679, 81 S. E. 938 (1914).
In In this way the plaintiff could have the benefit of settling the
grievance in one suit, without Incurring the danger of being'cut off by
limitations on the -theory that the cause of action arose when the continuing nuisance was first established. See Thackery v. Union Portland Cement Co., supra, n. 110, and 37 Harv. 598, et.seq.
2" See Stodghill v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 53 Ia. 341, 5 N. W. 495
(1880), Crane's Cases on Damages, 343.
2hicago & E. L B. Co. v. Loeb, 118 Ill. 203, 8 N. E. 460, 59
Am. St. R. 341 (1884). Likewise, if the land in which a "permanent"

nuisance is established, is sold to a Durchaser who continues to

maintain it, he is not liable. Byrne v. Monongahela West Penn. Pub.
Service Co., 106 W. Va. 594, 146 S. E. 522 (1929).
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; plea of limitations based on the claim that the only cause of
action arose when the nuisance was first established. 15 The
drastic consequences of the assumption that the plaintiff's right
is from"' the very beginning, either a single recovery of all damage, or successive actions for damage as it occurs, with no choice,
has led these courts, it seems, to drift toward making the remedies elective in fact if not in theory, by interpreting the particular situation in each case, as a "permanent" or a "transient" nuisance according to the manner in which the plaintiff
has pleaded it, whenever the evidence makes this acquiescence
at all possible. A more flexible practice in respect to the choice
between a single recovery and successive actions for continuing
wrong should be instituted in the various states, by statute or
rule of court." 6
If entire damages as for a permanent nuisance are given,
this precludes the plaintiff from claiming damages for the further continuance of the -injury, and thus confers a privilege or
easement upon the defendant.1 17 When compensation -once for
all for this future continuance of the injury is given, it is
measured by the depreciation in the value of the land, 118 or, as
Examples are Missouri Pao. R. Co. v. Davis, 186 Ark. 401. 53
S. W. (2d) 851 (1932) (operation of railway coal chute); Schlosser v.
Sanitary Dist., 299 Ill. 77, 132 N. E. 291 (1921)" (drainage canal);
McDaniel v. City of Cherryvale, 91 Kdn. 40, 136 Pac. 899 (1913) (discharge of sewage), see criticism, 2 Calif. L.Rev. 248.
UdThe writer would suggest a statute or rule along these lines: In
cases In the nature of trespass or nuisance, the normal measure of recovery shall be for past damages, but the complaint shall state whether
or not the situation is a continuing one, and if so, the plaintiff may
elect to claim entire damages for past and prospective invasions and
Injuries, which shall be allowed, and If the court finds that the injury
will continue indefinitely, then the prospective damages shall include
the depreciation in the value of' the plaintiff's land. In cases where
the defendant's structure or operations are protected by the power of
eminent domain, or where a court of equity would decline an injunction on grounds of public convenience, the plaintiff's choice shall not
be conclusive, but the defendant, in showing these facts, may elect to
pay entire damages, though the plaintiff has claimed past damages
only; or if the plaintiff has claimed entire damages, the defendant may
elect to pay past damages only, upon giving a sufficient bond or undertaking to remedy the injurious situation.
U,Thompson v. Illinois Central R. Co., 191 Ia. 35, 179 N. W. 191
(1920) (railway embankment); Payne v. Bevel, 99 Okla. 106, 225 Pac.
91 (1923) (same).
Central Georgia Power Co. v. Pope, 141 Ga. 186, 80 S. E. 642,
L. R. A. 1916D, 358; Choctaw, 0. & G. R. Co. v. Drew, 37 Okla. 396,130
Pac. 1149, 44 L. R. A. N. S. 38 (1913); Dec. and Curr. Dig., Nuisance,
Sec. 50(3).
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it wQuld seem, by the reasonable cost of protecting the land from
future injury, if that is less. In addition the past injuries,
such as loss of crops' 19 or loss of rentals and the personal discomforts, ill-health and inconvenience of the plaintiff and his
family, 120 before the time as of which the depreciation is measured, or as of which the nuisance is recognized as becoming
"permanent", must be paid for. The important problem of
choosing the time that shall be taken for measuring the depreciation of the plaintiff's land and thus for licensing the further
continuance of the injury, has not received the consideration it
deserves. Frequently, it is assumed that the valuation shall be
made as of the time when the permanent structure was completed, 121 but more often, as of the time when the first physical
invasion of the plaintiff's rights in land, air, or water, occurred,' 22 and occasionally, as of the time when the certainty
of such invasions became apparent 23 or even as of the time of
the trial.124 The rigid theory of a single cause of action, led
ulCity of Amarillo v. Ware, 120 Tex. 456, 40 S. W. (2d) 57(11)
(1931) (city system of storm sewers, causing recurrent overflows;
plaintiff can recover depreciation in the land as of the time of the
"injury," and the value of the crop then growing). But no recovery
can be had, in addition to depreciation, for loss of crops or rentals accruing after the permanent injury began. Lone Star Gas Co. v. Hutton,
.8 S. W. (2d) 19 (Tex. Com. ApD., 1933).
IODaniel v. Ft. Worth & R. G. R. Co., 96 Tex. 327, 72 S. W. 578
(1903) (railway coal-chute); Texas & P. 1. Co. v. Reeves, 256 S. W. 902
(Tex. Com. App., 192a) (round-house). But in cases where the location
and character of the structure inflicting the injury are as required by
law, only depreciation of the plaintiff's property may be recovered.
St. Louis, S. F. d T. R. Co. v. Shaw, 99 Tex. 559, 92 S. W. 30, 6 L. R. A.
N. S. 124, 122 Am. St. R. 663 (1906) (freight depot and spur tracks).
11 This is usually in cases where the completion of the structure
immediately brings injury. Southern Ice & 'Utilities Co. v. Bryan, 58
S. W. (2d) 920(5) (Ark., 1933) (ice plant; damages are difference in
value immediately before and after erection and operation of plant);
City of Greenville v. Elliott, 263 S. W. 1076 (Tex. Civ. App., 1924) (city
incinerator plant).
-The usual formula is that depreciation is measured as of the
time of the "injury." Brown v. Virginia-CarolinaChem. Co., 162 N. C.
83, 77 S. E. 1102, 45 L. R. A. N. S. 773 (1913) (chemical plant established, raising value of plaintiff's nearby property: some years later
the plant was changed by adding sulphurie acid chambers, thus inflicting noisome odors; held, depreciation to be measured as of time
of beginning of odors not original establishment of plant). City of
Amarillo v. Ware, supra, n. 119; 46 C. J. 829, n. 29.
-' See the discriminating discussion by Sharp, J., in City of AmnariZlo v. Ware, 40 S. W. (2d) 57, at pages 59, 60 (1931).
Sherman Gas & Electric Go. v. Belden, 103 Tex. 59, 123 S. W.
119(3), 27 L. R. A. N. S. 237 (1909) (plaintiff's residence affected by
smoke and vibration from electric light plant; held, plaintiff entitled
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the courts to assume that the time for determining when the
statute of limitations begins to run, the time for ascertaining
which of successive owners can sue, and which can be sued, and
the time adopted for measuring damages, must all be the same.
If one time of cleavage is to be adhered to, the time when the
first physical invasion occurred, seems the fairest, but different
time-criteria may well be worked out for these different purposes. If the flexible procedure, above suggested, of giving the
plaintiff the right to successive recoveries but with a power of
election to take permanent damages, should be adopted, then
the time of trial might well be used as the date for the assessment of the permanent damages, with past damages up to that
time, except in cases of public enterprises for which the time
of the establishment of the enterprise, or of the commencement
of the injury, might be more appropriate.
3.

RIGHT TO DAMAGES WHEN THE LAND IS UNDER LEASE.

If land which is occupied by a tenant, or other holder of a
limited interest, is injured, as by flood or fire or fumes, or by one
who enters and cuts timber, or any other past and completed
invasion, the question arises of the extent of the claims of the
occupant. The courts which have passed upon the question are
fairly evenly divided, one group holding that the occupant may.
recover only for the injury to his own tenancy or other interest, 25 leaving the landlord or other holder of the remaining
to damages for personal inconvenience and for depreciation as of time
of trial in value for any available use, of his property: instruction
fixing time of original establishment and operation of plant, as time
-for measuring depreciation, disapproved). See, however, later Texas
cases in notes 121, 122, supra.
'1Brown v. Woodliff, 89 Ga. 413, 15 S. E. 491 (1892) (life-tenant);
Zimmerman v. Shreve, 59 Md. 357 (1882), Warren's Cases on Property,
71 (life-tenant); Sherman v. Fall River Iron Works Co., 2 Allen
(Mass.) 524 (1861) (life-tenant); Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Parker,37
S. W. (2d) 1064(8) (Tex. Civ. App., 1931). It has even been held that
when the lessee has taken an assighment of the landlord's claim, that
the lessee cannot recover the full damages, and that each must sue
separately, in which event the actions can be consolidated. Logan
Central Coal Co. v. County Court, 106 W. Va. 578, 146 S. E. 371 (1929).
But in some states where the pleading has been modernized, the holders
of the different interests in the land, though their interests are separate and not joint, could join as co-plaintiffs. Cox v. Corrigan Steel Co.,
248 Ky. 426, 58 S. W. (2d) 625 (1933).
See note, "Right of action in case of damage to reversion or remainder by stranger," L. R. A. 1916A, 792, 805; and notes, 8 A. L. R.
100, Ann. C. 1916C. 881; 13 Minn. L. Rev. 736 (1929).
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interest to sue separately for the damage to that. There are,
however, strong arguments of convenience in favor of the contrary rule, adopted in New York, and some other states, 12 6
which permits the tenant or other limited owner in possession,
to recover the full damages to the land as if he were the holder
of the complete title. This practice seems calculated to reduce
the number of actions. The wrongdoer is protected against a
second recovery by the landlord, and the occupant who recovers
full damages holds all the surplus beyond compensation for his.
own injury, as trustee for the landlord or ultimate owner. 127
Still more difficult problems arise in cases where the structure or operations on the lands of the defendant produce continued invasions by way of nuisance or trespass, over a considerable period. We may suppose that the injurious situation
is first established, after the owner of the injured land has leased
his land to a tenant, and during the occupancy by the tenant.
In this situation, if only "temporary" damages for the past invasions and their results are to be sought, there is little difficulty.
The owner recovers for injury to the freehold, whereas the
tenant must sue for any injury to the usable value, loss of crops,
or damage to the possessory interest, accruing after his tenancy
began. 2 8 More doubt and dispute arise in cases where the
nuisance was already established and in operation at the time
that the tenant took his lease. In this situation, when the question is as to who may recover in successive actions for continuing "temporary" injury, the New York cases hold, as in the
situation just previously mentioned, that the line of division is
just the same,-that is, "temporary" damages for loss of use
'1 Cargill v. Sewall, 19 Me. 288 (1841)
(minister, against trespasser
on church land); Rogers v. Atlantic Gulf & Pao. Co., 213 N. Y. 246, 107
N. E. 661, L. R. A. 1916A, 787, Ann. C. 1916C, 877 (life-tenant; power
to sue not dependent upon his being liable to the reversioner for injuryto the land by third persons); Willey v. Laraway, 64 Vt. 559, 25 Atl.
436 (1892) (widow entitled to dower against one cutting wood).
,'See Rogers v. Atlantic, Gulf & Pac. Go., next preceding note.
A few cases have said that the tenant occupant can recover full
damages against the wrong-doer, only when the plaintiff shows that
he has made reparation to the ultimate owner for the injury. Calif.
Dry,Dock Co. v. Armstrong, 17 Fed. 216 (Circ. Ct., Calif.. 1883); Wood*
v. Griffin, 46 N. H. 231 (1865); Weston v. Gravlin, 49 Vt. 507 (1877);
sed 8 A. L. R. 625.
C8ity of Birmingham v. Ingram, 20 Ala. App. 444, 103 So. 595(6).
(1925); Towaliga Falls Power Co. v. Sinis, 6 Ga. App. 749, 65 S. E.
844 (11) (1909); Dec. and Curr. Dig., Nuisance, Sec: 50 (2).
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or loss of rental value before the beginning of the lease belong
to the owner, or other person then having the right of occupancy,
but for those arising after the beginning of the term, the tenant
alone can recover.' 29 This is a logical application of the general
doctrine that for interference with the use or possession of land,
the person then entitled to such use or possession should recover.
Nevertheless, the results are not always just. Usually the existence of the injurious situation will diminish the rent wrhich the
landlord will be able to demand, and if the tenant after getting
the land at. a reduced rent, is allowed to recover against the
wrongdoer for the injury to the usable value, he will be unjustly enriched. This has led the Iowa court to adopt the rule,
that while for a nuisance beginning during the occupancy of a
tenant, the landlord can not recover for loss of rental value
during such occupancy, yet if the nuisance began before the
lease was made, and caused the owner to lease the land for less
than its normal value, then the owner may recover for such
diminution in rental value up to the time of action brought. 30
This latter view would seem to leave to the tenant who leases
land already subjected to a nuisance a claim only for per.sonal
discomfort, 13 1 unless the court were disposed to adopt a more
flexible practice of permitting the tenant upon showing the
consent of the owner, to recover the full damage arising during
his occupancy, unless the owner has already recovered for loss
of rentals.
There seems to be but little discussion in the cases of the
question of how the damages shall be apportioned between landlord and tenant in cases of so-called "permanent" nuisance,
wherein a recovery of the depreciation in the sale-value of the
land is allowed, upon the hypothesis that injurious invasion&
B1aumann v. New York, 227 N. Y. 25, 124 N. E. 141, 8 A. I, R
595 (1919) (plaintiff, tenant at will, may recover for diminshed rental
value due to a continued operation of wells by defendant, draining
plaintiff's land, though wills were operated before beginning of plaintiff's tenancy; previous decisions in New York reviewed in opinion).
See also, Sherman v. Fall River Iron Works, 84 Mass. 524, 79 Am.
Dec. 799 (1861); McKee v. St. Louis, Etc., R. Co., 49 Mo. App. 174
(1892); Halsey Lehigh Valley R. Co., 45 N. J. Law, 26 (Sup. Ct., 1883);
4 Sutherland, Damages, Sec. 1056, 1057 (4th ed., 1916); notes, 3 L. R.
A. N. S. 1060 (1906); 8 A. L. R. 614.
2, S'tovern v. Town of Calmar, 204 Ia. 983, 216 N. W. 112 (2) (1927)
(pollution of creek running through plaintiff's land, by sewage system,
causing the plaintiff, owner, to have to rent the land for less).
2n
Sec. 75 and 76, supra.
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will continue indefinitely. 3 2 It seems reasonably clear, however, that if the land is in possession of the owner when the
nuisance comes into operation as a permanent injury, then under
the assumption of many of the cases that only one cause of action
can arise, this cause of action would go to the owner, and a
tenant who later secured his lease would have no claim whatever
for damage to his interest in the land. 3 3 Under this same assumption, if the nuisance becomes permanent while the land is
under lease, the tenant would recover the prospective injury
during the period of the term, the landlord the prospective injury to the reversion, 34 and both recoveries should not exceed,
in theory, the diminution in the value of the land as a whole
if it were not under lease. If the practice of giving the owner
an election to convert his claim from one for recurrent injuries
into one for permanent damages' 3 5 were adopted, then it would
seem that, if the land were under lease at the time when such
election were sought to be exercised, both the owner and the
tenant would have to join in the election, which if effectuated
would subject the use of the land to this burden.
112But see, in general, Winchester v. Stevens Point, 58 Wis. 350, 17
N. W. 3, 517 (1883), a leading case to the point that where permanent
damages for a continuing invasion are sought, mere rightful possession
in plaintiff is not sufficient to maintain the claim, and the state of the
title should be shown, as in condemnation proceedingd. See also W.
Lewis Roberts, A Possessor's Right to Damages for Permanent Injury
to Realty, 28 Ill. L. Rev. 919 (1934).
C
Chicago, R. 1. & P. 1. Go. v. Humphreys, 107 Ark. 330, 155 S. W.
127, L. R. A. 1916E 962 (tenant entering after construction of permanent culvert, cannot recover for overflow). See Kernochan v. Ncw York
E.levated R. Co., 128 N. Y. 559, 29 N. E. 65(1) (1891), in which it was
held that an owner whose property was injured by the' construction
of an elevated railway, and who later made a lease, could recover the
damage to the land, to the exclusion of the tenant. See the interpretation of this decision in Miller v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co., 184
N. Y. 17, 76 N. E. 734, 3 L. R. A. N. S. 1060 (1906).
,,-""Thata landlord may maintain an action against a stranger for
a permanent injury to his lands in the lossesslon of a tenant cannot
be doubted. By virtue of the lease an estate is carved out of the fee
and is vested in the tenant, but the landlord still has an inheritance
technically designated as the reversion. For a trespass upon the possession of the tenant or for injury to his estate, the right of action is
in him. An injury which affects the reversion is a wrong to the landlord, to be redressed by an action by him, although the tenant is in
possession. 24 Cyc. 925; Arneson v. Spawn, 2 S. D. 269, 49 N. W. 1066,
39 Am. St. Rep. 783. The wrong may be such as to affect both these
distinct interests. This gives a right of action to the owner of each."
Custer Consol. Mines Co. v. City of Helena, 45 Mont. 146, 122 Pac. 567,
569 (1912) (dictum).
Il See the next previous section.

